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Fissell: Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law

FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Brenner M. Fissell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has created an
expansive and nearly comprehensive body of constitutional criminal
procedure. These are the familiar rules about police investigation and
fair trials. At the same time, though, the Court has repeatedly resisted
doing the same for substantive criminal law and sentencing. It has
generally avoided limiting what can be a crime, how it must be defined,
and how much it can be punished. As William Stuntz concluded, while
"policing and the trial process" have been "aggressively" regulated,
"substantive criminal law" has been essentially left "to the politicians."'
It takes an entire law school course to read just the highlights of the
search and seizure cases; with respect to what can be a crime and how it
must be defined, though, "constitutional law places few limits . . . save
for crimes that involve speech, consensual sex, or reproduction." 2 Cases
limiting substantive criminal law are so few that they are all individually
famous-think Lawrence v. Texas 3 or Griswold v. Connecticut.' What is
the reason for this imbalance? This is a question that has long vexed
scholars, and one that is worthy of renewed attention.
Past attempts to understand the case law have yielded more
frustration than insight. Precisely because they are so small in number,
and seemingly so random, scholars have mostly labored in vain to
synthesize a theory of the Court's constitutional limits on substantive
criminal law. In this Article, I propose a new approach. If the default

* Brenner Fissell is an affiliated scholar at Georgetown University Law Center. Starting in
the fall of 2018, he will be an Associate Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra University.
1. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitutionof CriminalJustice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780.
782 (2006).
2. Id. at 790 (footnotes omitted); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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presumption is that criminal law will not be constitutionalized, then the
best way to piece together a theory of the Court's behavior is to look at
the cases where it rejects constitutional claims. When we do this, the
randomness that has frustrated commentators disappears, and is replaced
by a remarkable consistency. One rationale is routinely invoked from the
1950s onward-at least once per decade-it is federalism. This is
significant, and indicates that there is an enduring and important
justification for judicial restraint here. Unearthing this line of reasoning
is the first contribution of this Article.
Surprisingly, though, neither the Court nor the academy have fully
examined the strength of federalism in this context. This is likely
because the criminal law is most closely associated with the "police
power," which has always been understood to be the province of the
states. The second goal of this Article, then, is to undertake that missing
assessment. Overall, I conclude that the argument is weaker than the
Court seems to believe, and is certainly not worthy of its status as a neartruism. While the Court invokes federalism uniformly to reject
constitutional limitations on substantive criminal law, this Article argues
that this is conceptually imprecise. To understand whether the federalism
argument does the work it is supposed to do, we must first understand
more clearly what is meant by "federalism," and the type of
constitutional rule that it is used to resist. As we will see, the soundness
the argument is dependent on the context in which it is deployed, but the
Court has ignored this complexity.
This Article presents its assessment of federalism in two parts.
First, it offers an internal critique of the Court's own federalism-based
reasoning in constitutional criminal cases. Next, it engages in a
hypothetical discussion of how yet unused federalism theories would
apply in the same context. The overarching goal is to provide a
framework for analysis, adding nuance to the Court's invocation of
federalism while marking its strengths or weaknesses along the way.
We will begin with the internal critique-the assessment of the
Court's reasoning as made explicit in the case law. Here, the Court's
discussion of federalism can be broken down into two variants:
"Experimentation
Federalism"
and
"Morality
Federalism."
Experimentation Federalism is the argument that states ought to be able
to experiment when addressing the problem of crime, and that their
closeness to the problem will give them an edge.5 Morality Federalism is
the argument that, because criminal law ought to reflect the morality of
the community that creates it and is governed by it, lawmaking
5.

See infra Part IV.A.
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jurisdictions will better reflect this morality if they are geographically
smaller.' Both types of federalism-based arguments are employed by the
Court when it refuses to create constitutional criminal law, but they are
analytically distinct.
Beyond this, the Court's cases reject more than just one type of
limitation on state criminal law-instead, federalism defeats the creation
of three categories of constitutional rule: (1) offense definition rules (the
way a crime can be defined);' (2) rights granting or conduct protection
rules (what can be a crime);' and (3) sentence proportionality rules (how
much a crime can be punished). 9 An example of an offense definition
rule that the Court has refused to impose is the requirement that a crime
have a mens rea element; an example of a rejected conduct protection
rule is the right to assisted-suicide; an example of a rejected
proportionality rule is that life-imprisonment for "three strikes" is cruel
and unusual punishment.
The federalism argument is at its weakest when applied to the first
category-offense definition rules. This is because offense definition
rules are trans-substantive, and therefore do little to inhibit state policy
choices in dealing with the problem of crime. The most important
feature of the state "laboratory" is the ability to make substantive
determinations of what is and is not criminalized so as to reduce socially
harmful conduct. Offense definition rules that apply to all the various
categories of conduct (trans-substantively) only minimally work against
the concerns of Experimentation Federalism; they do not cordon off any
category from criminalization, and therefore put little restriction on the
"laboratory." For example, if there were a constitutional requirement
that all crimes required that the act be committed voluntarily, this says
nothing about what the substantive content of that act must be. Morality
Federalism is similarly a weak argument, although less weak, when
applied to offense definition rules-not because of the logic of the
argument, but because the vast majority of offense definition rules will
not implicate moral viewpoints that will be geographically concentrated.
It is highly unlikely, for example, that ethical stances on the requirement
of a voluntary act would be clustered in a state jurisdiction. To the extent
that this would be controversial at all, disagreement will be
geographically diffuse. Ironically, while the federalism argument is
weakest when applied to offense definition rules, it is in these cases
where it appears most often.
6.
7.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.B.

8.

See infa Part V.C.

9.

See infra Part V.D.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6

492

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:489

Federalism is a stronger argument when applied to the second
category of constitutional rules-conduct protection, or rights-granting
rules-but its application to this context is unappealing for an outside
reason. Federalism here accords deference to states in their restriction of
individual liberty and punishment of its exercise. This is bad on its own,
but it can also result in the use of criminal law to oppress minorities.
This is most apparent with Morality Federalism. If this kind of
federalism is used to prevent the court from protecting conduct from
criminalization, it allows local morality to resist the promulgation of
rights that are recognized by the broader national community. While we
might value local moral viewpoints in many areas of law, criminal law
seems to be an unappealing vehicle for these views. An example of this
is the now-rejected majoritarian reasoning of Bowers v. Hardwick."o
Moreover, this same observation makes Experimentation Federalism
problematic, as the experimentation that would be prevented by a rightsgranting rule is, again, experimentation with the restriction of liberty.
Beyond this, conduct protection rules seem to transcend experimentation
concerns entirely. Experimentation Federalism is predicated on tinkering
with different methods to reach shared goals; conduct protection rules
alter the goals themselves. For example, Griswold placed the issue of
contraception use entirely beyond the reach of state punishment." This
obviated any need to "experiment" with how to more effectively deter
the conduct through criminal law.
It is in the third category of constitutional rules, sentencing
proportionality rules, that the federalism argument is at its apex. Given
the complexity of assessing appropriate punishments, Experimentation
Federalism works well here. There is no one right way, and a varied
approach across different jurisdictions will hopefully yield advances in
the science of penology. These are all good arguments in theory, but
they are undermined by the reality of state practice, which often makes
punishments the product of political reactions to sensational, publicized
crimes. Laws aiming to protect young children illustrate this well. For
states to fully participate in the experimentation that federalism
anticipates, they need to increase their usage of social science and
criminological data, basing their punishments on facts and not emotions.
Otherwise, states weaken their federalism claim, and strengthen the
argument that judicial intervention is needed. Morality Federalism is
similarly valid, and perhaps at its strongest, when applied to sentencing
decisions. It is true that certain states may face a more serious problem

10. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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with certain conduct than others do, and will therefore want to deter it
with greater punishment. Moreover, other states may view conduct as
more worthy of retribution based on their citizens' moral viewpoints.
However, the same concerns regarding discriminatory liberty-restriction
noted above are also salient here sentencing regimes also invite the
oppression of minorities-mandatory life-in-prison "recidivist" statutes
are a good example.
After completing the internal critique of the Court's reasoning just
sketched out, we will turn to the assessment of other federalism theories
that would potentially defeat constitutional criminal law claimstheories yet unused by the Court in this specific context.12 Drawing on
the canonical framework of the values of federalism presented in
Gregory v. Ashcroft," the discussion will be supplemented with four
new theories: "Liberty Federalism," "Participation Federalism,"
"Mobility Federalism," and "Inherent Sovereignty Federalism."l 4 As we
will see, while some of these theories are likely unused in constitutional
criminal cases because they are wholly inapplicable, others would
support the current climate of judicial restraint." This Article addresses
them in turn.
Liberty Federalism is the theory that federalism is worthwhile
because a system of dual sovereignty is expected to prevent each
sovereign from infringing on individual liberty.'" This variant of
federalism, though, does little work in justifying the absence of
constitutional criminal law-such a body of rules would only work to
increase freedom by limiting crime definition and sentencing. It is hard
to imagine, for example, how a rule against mandatory "three strikes"
laws would be a setback to liberty.
Participation Federalism aligns the values of federalism with the
values of democracy, and holds that smaller jurisdictions further enable
democratic involvement." This type of federalism is a valid argument
against judicially created rules about offenses, as such rules present the
familiar problem of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," and thwart
expressions of political will. Still, we note in response that
"participation" for politically weak out-groups will not be protected
without judicial help (so-called "representation reinforcement"), and that
criminal defendants fit many of the typical features of such groups. For
12.

See infra Part VI.B.

13.

501 U.S. 452 (1991), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).

14.

See infra Part VI.B.

15.
16.
17.

See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part VI.B. 1.
See infra Part V1.B.2.
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example, sex offenders are the easiest of political punching bags, and
judicial intervention may therefore be more warranted in this area.
Mobility Federalism is the theory that the existence of the states
allows citizens to "vot[e] with their feet" and that this creates healthy
jurisdictional competition.' Like Participation Federalism, a mobilitybased theory is conceptually valid when used against constitutional
criminal rules: a national rule would eliminate the market for
competition in the area that it covers. Still, the Court may have refrained
from using such an argument in a criminal case because the assumption
of completely free mobility-a fiction tolerated in other regulatory
areas-is intolerable when talking about punishment. Such a theory
countenances punishment based solely on economic disparities the
ability to be mobile. One could imagine a state becoming more socially
conservative due to demographic changes, thus leaving those unable to
leave vulnerable to moralistic criminalization.
Last to consider is Inherent Sovereignty Federalism-the argument
that state sovereignty is intrinsically valuable, and that the states'
historic residual powers were only partially altered by the Constitution.' 9
Because such a theory presumes originalism as an interpretive method, it
would foreclose the creation of most unenumerated rights applicable to
criminal law. However, we note that one originalist theory-the
"presumption of liberty"-would justify such rules as being grounded in
the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 20 For
example, the common law's requirement of a voluntary act might be
seen as a right "retained" by the people even after ratification.
By the end of this Article, we will have completed a comprehensive
critique and assessment of the different theories of federalism as applied
to constitutional criminal law.' What the Court understands to be a
uniformly applicable and uncontestable truism is, as we will see, far
more problematic. Having undermined the invocation of federalism in
this context, we will have come a small way toward understanding the
question that motivated the inquiry: why so much criminal procedure
and so little substantive criminal law? We will know, at least, that the
Court's own primary explanation cannot simply be taken at face value.

18. See infla Part VI.B.3.
19. See intfa Part VI.B.4.
20. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 259-61 (2004); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. IX.

21. See infia Parts Il-Vi.
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Part II addresses the scholarship regarding substantive criminal law
and the Constitution, concluding that this area of law is undeveloped.2 2
Part III undertakes a survey of every case in which a state criminal law is
challenged as unconstitutional, and in which the Court rejected that
claim by invoking federalism. 23 Part IV discusses the two primary
variations of federalism used in these cases, as well as four theories
drawn from cases in different contexts.24 Part V addresses the different
types of constitutional rules that are rejected in the cases discussed in
Part II (or might be rejected in future cases): offense-definition rules,
25
conduct-protection rules, and sentencing proportionality rules. Part VI
analyzes the application of the federalism argument variants to the three
constitutional rule-types, noting the strengths and weaknesses of the
argument in each context. Part VI begins with the internal assessment of
the Court's reasoning, and addresses the two primary federalism theories
used in the case law.26 Part VI then turns to an assessment of the
potential application of yet unused theories. 27
II.

LITERATURE REVIEw: THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

We begin with a descriptive claim: when viewed against the body
of constitutional criminal procedure, there is very little constitutional
criminal law. By "substance" I mean the definition of what a criminal
offense is and how much it can be punished, and "procedure" the way
that offense must be investigated and proven.28 While entire law school
courses are devoted to criminal procedure, constitutional limits on
criminal law form but a small part of the reading material for that
subject.29 Scholars have not failed to notice this reality. In 1958, Henry
M. Hart, Jr., excoriated the Supreme Court for its failure to articulate a

22.
23.
24.
25.

See
See
See
See

26.

See infra Part VI.A.

infra Part
infa Part
infla Part
inf/La Part

11.

Ill.
IV.
V.

27. See inf/i Part VI.B.
28. George Fletcher describes this as the distinction between "guilt in principle" (substantive
rules) and "guilty in fact" (procedural rules). GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL

LAW 7 (1998).
29.

See, e.g., SANFORD A. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND

MATERIALS 440-41, 566-80 (10th ed. 2017).
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coherent requirement of mens rea.30 But this failure was just the first
of many.
Writing in 1979, John Jeffries and Paul B. Stephan concluded, "At
least in terms of judicial exposition, the existence of constitutional
constraints on the substantive criminal law is largely terra incognita."3
This was in sharp contrast with the area of criminal procedure:
The Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention to issues of
procedural justice and, to a lesser extent, to the sufficiency and
reliability of the evidence on which conviction is based. Yet even as
the Supreme Court was fashioning an entire body of federal
constitutional law on criminal procedure, it remained reluctant to
restrict legislative authority over the substantive definition of crime.
With few, though important, exceptions, the Court's opinions in the
field of substantive criminal law have been confined to the
construction of federal statutes, and the states have remained largely
free to define the penal law as they see fit.

. .

. There exists today, as

there has for many years, a decided imbalance in the development of
constitutional doctrine. The result is an elaborate body of law
governing procedural rights and a dearth of constitutional authority on
the minimal conditions of substantive justice. 3
This was written after decades of the Warren Court's activity in the
area of criminal procedure, but it still holds true today.
Where the Court has involved itself in substantive criminal law is
in random areas marked out for specific protection-"special
constitutional protections for certain kinds of activity," notably the First
Amendment and "privacy." 33 Because this case law lacks comprehensive
scope, Jeffries and Stephan wrote, "These incidental limits imposed on
the criminal law . . . do not . . . contribute much to the notion of minimal
constitutional standards applicable to crime definition generally." 34 A

30. See Henry M. Hart. Jr.. The Aims ofthe Criminal/Leai' 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
431-36 (1958) ("From beginning to end, there is scarcely a single opinion by any member of the
Court which confronts the question in a fashion which deserves intellectual respect."); see also
Markus Dirk Dubber, Toaord a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
509. 519 (2004) ("On the topic of constitutional criminal law, Hart's essay . . is best read as a
provocation, or perhaps a manifesto, rather than as a coherent account. At its core is an insight about
the relationship between constitutional criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure that Hart
characteristically formulates as a rhetorical question: 'What sense does it make to insist upon
procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first
place?"' (footnote omitted) (quoting Hart, supra, at 431)).
31. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proofin the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1366 (1979).
32. Id. at 1366-67 (footnotes omitted).

33.

Id. at 1367 n.123; see U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

34.

Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 31, at 1367.
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good example is "overbreadth" doctrine: while it showed initial potential
to be applicable to criminal law universally, the Court then explicitly
limited it to the First Amendment context.
Jeffries and Stephan offered two hypotheses to explain this
"historic imbalance." The first was the "decline and disgrace of
substantive due process,"" which left "the Court and the bar without any
familiar doctrinal basis for prescribing the minimal content of the law of
crimes."' The second was "the traditional conception of the law of
crimes as essentially static and unchanging, determined more by AngloSaxon inheritance than by any fresh perception of public policy, and
quite unlikely to be subject to radical legislative innovation.""
Substantive limits were the province of the common law, not
the Constitution.
By the end of the century, other scholars would note the lack of
progress in creating a constitutional criminal law. Surveying the case
law in 1996, William Stuntz concluded that the "[c]riminal law, like the
vast spheres of civil regulation, is basically a nonconstitutional field;
disputes about the definition of crimes rarely intersect with disputes
about constitutional law." 39 Again, there were random exceptions-such
as vagueness doctrine, free speech, and the right to "privacy."4 0 What
was lacking was a general "substantive due process aimed specifically
at criminal law."4 1 In 2001, Stuntz wrote that the creation of
a constitutional criminal law, according to the conventional view,
"seems absurd." 4 2

Stuntz was more interested in the problems that resulted from this
state of affairs, than he was in explaining its cause, but he did offer

35.

Compare Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268-69 n.18 (1984) ("[O]utside the limited First

Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad."), with Aptheker v. Sec'y
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964) (applying the overbreadth doctrine to the right to travel).
36. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 31, at 1367.
37. Id.

38. Id. at 1367-68.
39. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process. and the Civil-CriminalLine, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 6 (1996).
40. Id. "[C]onstitutional law places few limits on crime definition, save for crimes that
involve speech, consensual sex, or reproduction. (The large majority of crimes involve none of
those things.)." Stuntz, supra note 1, at 790 (footnotes omitted).
41. Stuntz, supra note 39, at 6-7.
42. Williamn J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,

588 (2001).
43. Stuntz. supra note 1, at 802-03. Put succinctly, Stuntz theorized that a
constitutionalization of procedure without a constitutionalization of substance created a perverse
political incentive for the legislatures to over-criminalize and create draconian sentencing laws.
The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and after helped to create the harsh justice
of the 1970s and after....Political incentives are the mechanism. Constitutional law
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some hypotheses. He posited that the success of constitutional criminal
procedure-and the concomitant failure of substance-may be because
there was little state law to displace in the area of procedure.44 He also
assessed more conventional explanations, including the general sense
that the determination of proportionality-whether "particular offenses
are serious enough to justify the penalty attached to them"-is too
"formless," and is "policy with a thin legal veneer." 45 Critics, he wrote,
might also view such a task as too akin to the creation of "common-law
crime[s]"-something "old but abandoned (so we all assume)." 46
In 1998, Louis Bilionis also wrote about the absence of
constitutional criminal law, but from a less critical point of view. 47 In
making his sympathetic argument, though, Bilionis agreed with our
descriptive point: the Court has basically stayed out of substantive
criminal law.48 Moreover, the burden of proof cases proved to be similar
creates a series of political taxes and subsidies, making some kinds of legislation and law
enforcement more expensive and others cheaper. Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court
has regulated policing and trial procedure aggressively, while leaving substantive
criminal law and (until the past few years) noncapital sentencing to the politicians.
Consequently, legislators find it easy to expand criminal codes and raise sentences but
harder to regulate policing and the trial process. . . . [C]onstitutional law has made
legislation in constitutionally unregulated areas politically cheap.
Id. at 78 1-82, 792 (footnotes omitted).
44. Stuntz, supra note 42, at 588 n.292 ("It would be a very different enterprise to
constitutionalize criminal law, where huge and elaborate bodies of nonconstitutional law already
exist.").
45. Stuntz, supra note 39, at 30-31 (footnote omitted). He reiterates this point in his second
article:
Those opinions will not seem terribly lawlike. If the Supreme Court's proportionality
cases teach anything, they teach the impossibility of applying something that looks and
feels like legal analysis to the question whether a given crime deserves a given
sentence.... The distinction can only be drawn by courts making open-ended.
ungrounded value judgments: this behavior merits punishment; that behavior doesn't, for
no better reason than because I think so (and because I think and hope most of the local
population will agree). It sounds like the antithesis of the rule of law.
Stuntz, supra note 42, at 593 (footnote omitted).
46. Stuntz, supra note 39, at 38.
47. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH.

L. REV. 1269, 1277, 1299-1318 (1998). Bilionis argued that the Court deliberately refrained from
entering the area of constitutional criminal law so as to leave it to democratic process, and that the
seemingly random points of intervention were not random at all-but instead examples of "process

reinforcement." Id. at 1302, 1318-23.
48.
To [scholars'] dismay, the Supreme Court has-with two exceptions-seemingly resisted
the notion. The two exceptions are familiar. First came the 1957 case of Lambert v.
California, in which the Court came as close as it ever has to constitutionalizing a mens
rea requirement as fundamental to the just imposition of a criminal sanction. Lambert
was followed in 1962 by Robinson v. California, in which the Court came as close as it
ever has to constitutionalizing criminal law's other Latin half, the element of actus
reus.... Yet what followed from Lambert and Robinson, the received wisdom holds, is a
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non-starters.4 9 As Bilionis summarized, "All in all, four decades have
passed since Henry Hart lamented the Supreme Court's failure to forge a
relationship between the Constitution and substantive criminal law, and
not much seems to have changed." 0
Markus Dubber, too, assessed the body of scholarship and case law
in this area:
It has become a commonplace that there are no meaningful
constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law. While
procedural criminal law is thoroughly constitutionalized, so much so
that criminal procedure has become synonymous with constitutional
criminal procedure, the law of crime and punishment has remained
virtually untouched by constitutional scrutiny.5 1
Instead, the Court's chosen points of entry into criminal law seem
random, and incoherent. Discussion is dominated by consideration of the
right at issue, not the fact that it was subverted by a state criminal
offense: "Occasionally the Court has taken up issues of constitutional
criminal law, without recognizing them as such. (Much, perhaps most, of
the Court's constitutional criminal law jurisprudence is accidental, as the
abortion and euthanasia cases illustrate.)."52
Attempts to synthesize a theory of constitutional criminal law from
these haphazard interventions are therefore a fool's errand. Dubber
wrote that "[r]educing constitutional criminal law to a search for
oracular signs from the U.S. Supreme Court makes little sense."
Because the Court has been "notoriously fickle" in this area, and because
the "case and controversy" requirement often results in narrow rules, we
story of unfulfilled potential, the unexciting tale of an exciting substantive constitutional
criminal law that never came to be. The curse that Justice Frankfurter cast upon the
majority in his dissent in Lambert appears to have stuck, for the case indeed 'tum[ed] out
to be an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on the
waters of the law.' Robinson, meanwhile, was consigned to a fate only slightly less
forlorn, relegated to the outermost fringe of the criminal law by the narrow reading
placed upon it six years later by the Court in Powell v. Texas.
Id. at 1269-70 (quoting Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
49.
Nor has a substantive constitutional criminal law sprung, as some have hoped, from
robust interpretations of the presumption of innocence and the requirement that guilt be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court stiffened its back toward
such interpretations in Patterson v. New York, and its posture has shown no real signs of
relaxation since.
Id. at 1270-71 (footnotes omitted).
50. Id. at 1271 (footnote omitted).
51. Dubber, supra note 30, at 509-10 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 52 1 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 528.
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ought not attempt to "squeeze sense out of the Supreme Court's illconsidered efforts on substantive criminal law over the decades." 54
"Commentators by and large have waited for the Court to set the
agenda," Dubber wrote, and "[t]hey are waiting still."55
Like other commentators, Dubber offers potential explanations for
this "fickle" intervention. The Court, he believes, has bought into two
forms of "fetishism": process and federalism." The Court thinks that "a
good (or constitutional) procedure can save any state action, no matter
how bad (or unconstitutional),"5 ' and that "criminal lawmaking is taken
to be one, perhaps the, manifestation of the power of governance most
closely associated with the states, the police power, which is also widely
recognized as the power of governance least susceptible to definition,
never mind limitation." These are related: "Federalism and process
fetishism go hand-in-hand because federal constitutional oversight of a
state's procedural application of its criminal laws is thought to be less
intrusive than oversight of the making of the laws in the first place." 5
Like Stuntz, Bilionis, and Dubber, other commentators have
addressed the central question in passing-in the course of discussing
the mens rea "requirement"" or the burden of proof cases." All agree

54. Id. at 528-29 (footnote omitted). Dubber notes that there is a lack of scholarly literature on
the topic and posits the following reason:
Perhaps one reason for this absence is the Court's habit to reverse itself in short order on
issues of constitutional criminal law, as in Robinson and Powell (actus reus), Mdlanet
and Patterson (burden of proof), and in Rummel, Hutto, Solem, Harmelin, and now
Eswing (proportionality). Other opinions were not reversed, but instead left adrift "as a
derelict on the waters of the law." Perhaps if the Court had not sent its watchers reeling
almost as soon as they had begun to make another cautious foray into one corner of
constitutional criminal law, someone might have begun the task of assembling the bits
and pieces of doctrine into a whole. Instead, these partial academic projects of
construction were condemned to irrelevance, and abandoned, as soon as the Supreme
Court changed course, again.
Id. at 521-22 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 521.
Id. at 510 n.2.
Id. at 519.

58.

Id. at 510 (footnote omitted).

59.

Id. at 510 n.2.

60. See, e.g., Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: a Pleafor A Due Process Concept of
Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REv. 322, 367-69 (1966): Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional

Inntocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 882 (1999).
61. See, e.g., Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur. The Supreme Court, and the Substantive
CriminalLaw-An Evaninationofthe Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269, 28586 (1977): Donald A. Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus ofthe Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF. L.

REV. 1665, 1689-1703 (1987): Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 31, at 1328-44; Scott E. Sundby, The
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 462-74, 487-88

(1989).
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with the basic point-there is very little meaningful constitutional
regulation of criminal law. Surveying the past decades from the
standpoint of 1997, Ronald Allen wrote, "Virtually every . . . foray of

the Court into the constitutional aspects of the substantive criminal
law .

..

[is] typified by early cases that seem to have lurking in them

grand pronouncements that would curtail state control over the criminal
law" and "[fn each case, those grand pronouncements were ground
down to virtual insignificance in subsequent cases." 62 In 1999, Alan
Michaels concluded, "The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant
to develop substantive due process rules governing what may be
considered constitutionally proper objects of punishment. The Court has
repeatedly and emphatically stated that deciding what is criminal is the
right of the legislatures, particularly the state legislatures, in the
first instance."6
IlI.

A

FOCUS ON CASES UPHOLDING STATE CRIMINAL LAWS

Having surveyed prominent commentators' estimations of the
absence of case law (and their tentative explanations for it), it is now
worth undertaking a new reading with fresh eyes. While these
commentators lamented the lack of coherence in the Court's approach to
substantive criminal law, this vision likely resulted from a focus on cases
where the Court did intervene to promulgate a rule. Thus, it seems
random that privacy and vagueness are constitutionalized, whereas mens
rea is not.64 We will do the opposite, and focus on the cases where the
Court does not intervene-where the Court refuses to find that a state
criminal law is unconstitutional.1 5 After all, if the status quo is the lack
of constitutional regulation, then the theory to be found is one of
inaction or restraint.
As we will see, in cases where the Court refuses to invalidate a state
criminal law, there is a rationale that appears with consistency:
federalism. This is not to say that it is the only rationale, or the most

62. Ronald J. Allen, Foreword: Montana v. Egelhoff-Reflections on the Limits ofLegislative
Imagination andJudicial Authority, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 648-49 (1997).
63. Michaels, supra note 60, at 882 (footnotes omitted).
64. Moreover, when viewed together the burden of proof cases have been described as
unintelligible. See Dubber, supra note 30, at 522-30 (first citing Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of
In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens ofPersuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New
York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30, 36-43, 45-53 (1977); and then citing Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and
the Notion of an Qffense, 88 CALIF. L. Ruv. 335, 343-49 (2000)) (discussing attempts to create
theory of the burden of proof cases).
65. See infra Part Ill.
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important. 6 6 With notable exceptions, 67 though, federalism appears in the
vast majority of these cases."
In what follows, we will trace out the development of this
"federalism rationale," and will see that it makes an appearance at least
once every decade from the 1950s onward.69
A.

Leland v. Oregon

We begin, in 1952, with the case of Leland v. Oregon.70 In Leland,
the defendant challenged a state statute that required the insanity defense
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the defense." The Court held
that this law did not violate the Due Process Clause. 2
The Court in Leland began its analysis by noting that the Oregon
law "adopted the prevailing doctrine of the time," which was the familiar
M'Naghten's rule." However, at the time the case was decided, Oregon
was the last remaining jurisdiction to require that the defense be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.74 Twenty other states at the time made the
burden a preponderance of the evidence, and the federal government had
made the burden "clear[]" proof. 5 Interestingly, the Leland Court quoted

66. Nor is it to say that proffered rationales necessarily explain a decision. They may be
nothing more than rhetorical makeweights. Nevertheless, even rhetoric is worthy of critical analysis
when it is enshrined in fundamental law, For an example of a scholar who has taken note of the
federalism rhetoric, but seen it as masking a deeper concern see Youngjae Lee, Federalism and the
Eighth Amendment, 98 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 69, 71-73 (2013) (noting that the Court's refusal to
implement proportionality rules is due to uncertainty about theories of punishment, despite
federalism language in opinions).
67. One area where I have not found evidence of federalism-based arguments is the First
Amendment. Cases upholding criminal statutes as non-violative of this constitutional provision
instead treat "the state" as a monolithic concept, without attention to the fact that there are indeed
many different states. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-11 (1940) ("When clear
and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or
punish is obvious."). This may be a feature of the strict scrutiny test, which looks to an abstracted
governmental interest.
68. Of the cases outside the First Amendment that uphold a state criminal law and do not
invoke federalism, I only found one. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 453, 461-62 (2001)
(holding that retroactive judicial abolition of a "year and a day rule" for murder causation did not
violate the Due Process Clause). In Rogers, the Court was more concerned with retroactivity and
with the nature of common law adjudication. See id at 461-62.
69. See infra Part III.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

343 U.S. 790 (1952).
Id. at 793.
Id. at 799-801; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Leland, 343 U.S. at 796 (quoting M'Naghten's Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (H.L.)).
Id at 797-98.

75.

Id. The federal standard was announced in 1895. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.

469, 483-93 (1895).
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the case establishing the federal rule-Davis v. United StateS76 -which
stated, "[I]t is desirable that there be uniformity of rule in the
administration of the criminal law in governments whose constitutions
equally recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential
for the protection of life and liberty."77 However, Leland was quick to
distinguish that observation as irrelevant to the case at bar: "The
decision obviously establishes no constitutional doctrine, but only the
rule to be followed in federal courts. As such, the rule is not in question
here." 78 Apparently, uniformity was only desirable within a jurisdiction.
Across the states, though, there was no similar demand. Contrasting
the preponderance jurisdictions with the single beyond a reasonable
doubt jurisdiction-Oregon-the Court wrote, "[W]e see no practical
difference of such magnitude as to be significant in determining the
constitutional question we face here."" In fact, the popularity of a given
practice was not determinative with respect to the Due Process claim:
The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not
conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due
process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the
practice "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."s 0
Popularity is relevant, but it will not carry the day.
The reason for this begins, on its face, as a product of judicial
restraint. Quoting Justice Frankfurter in an older case, the Court stated,
"The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move
within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based
upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.""
Judicial restraint concerns then dovetail, though, into those of
federalism. After warning of the "idiosyncrasies of . . personal
judgment" by Justices, the Court stated, "We are therefore reluctant to
interfere with Oregon's determination of its policy . . . since we cannot

say that policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of
justice."8 It is not just that individual judge's predilections ought not be
enshrined into law, but also that those predilections, if given legal effect,

76. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
77. Leland, 343 U.S. at 797 (quoting Davis, 160 U.S. at 488).
78. Id
79. Id. at 798.
80. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
81. Id at 799 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)).
82. Id
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would thwart the "determination of [a State's] policy."" Thus, the issue
of insanity was not merely a scientific issue, but a question "of basic
policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine
criminal responsibility." 8 4 The word "policy" is a telltale sign that the
Court was committing the issue to the State's discretion-policy is a
political choice."
Even Justice Frankfurter's dissent, while disagreeing with its
implication, seemed compelled to invoke federalism. "Especially is
deference due to the policy of a State when it deals with local crime, its
repression and punishment," he wrote. 6 Still, "[t]here is a gulf, however
narrow, between deference to local legislation and complete disregard of
the duty of judicial review.""
Thus, in Leland, the stage is already set for decades of recurring use
of the federalism rationale. Leland contrasts fundamental justice with the
inherently discretionary concept of "policy," and tethers the "policy"
decision to the individual state-jurisdiction."
B.

Ferguson v. Skrupa

Next to consider is the 1963 case of Ferguson v. Skrupa." In
Ferguson, Kansas had made it a misdemeanor offense for any person to
engage "in the business of debt adjusting" except as an incident to "the
lawful practice of law in this state."90 "Debt adjusting" meant what we
might today call a credit relief or consolidation." A three-judge district
court held that this law violated the Due Process Clause, relying on
Lochner-esque reasoning.92

83. See id
84. Id at 801 (footnote omitted).
85. "In sum, within any single State in our representative democracy, voters may exercise
their political will to direct state policy . . . ." Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
42 (1994).
86. Leland, 343 U.S. at 807 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
87. Id
88. Id. at 798-99 (majority opinion).
89. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
90. Id. at 726-27 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2464 (1961, repealed 1969)).
91. Id. at 727 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2464).
The statute defines "debt adjusting" as "the making of a contract, express, or implied
with a particular debtor whereby the debtor agrees to pay a certain amount of money
periodically to the person engaged in the debt adjusting business who shall for a
consideration distribute the same among certain specified creditors in accordance with a
plan agreed upon."
Id (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2464).
92. Id. at 727-28; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The Court, unsurprisingly, reversed. The rationale began with one
of judicial restraint and concomitant deference to the legislature in
economic regulation.94 Like in Leland, though, this then bled into an
invocation of federalism through the language of state policy discretion:
"It is now settled that States 'have power to legislate against what are
found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affairs . . . ."'9 Thus, "the Kansas Legislature was free to decide
for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the business of
debt adjusting."96
C.

Powell v. Texas

The next-and perhaps most comprehensive representation of the
federalism argument appears in a 1968 case Powell v. Texas.9 7 Powell is
well known to students of criminal law as the case that limited the rule
of Robinson v. California,98 (against status crimes), and it therefore
holds an important place in the narrative of "unfulfilled potential." 9
Powell involved a challenge to a Texas offense which read as
follows: "Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication
in any public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be
fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.""oo The defendant argued that
the Eighth Amendment prohibited punishment for this conduct, given
the rule against status crimes announced in Robinson.'0 ' The Court
upheld the law, and named two primary rationales: "Traditional
common-law concepts of personal accountability and essential
considerations of federalism ....
These rationales are really fused, though: the Court thought that
criminal law should be guided by the common law, and that the common
law is state law. "We cannot," wrote the Court, "cast aside the centurieslong evolution of the collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts
which the common law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of
an individual for his antisocial deeds."' And, these tools are useful
93. Skrpa, 372 U.S. at 731-33.
94. Id. at 730.
95. Id. (quoting Lincoln Fed. Lab. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536 (1949)).
96. Id. at 731.
97. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
98. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
99. Powell, 392 U.S. at 532 (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. 660).
100.

Id. at 517 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477 (West 1913)).

101. Id. at 531-32; see U.S. CONsT. arnend VIII.
102. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535.
103. Id. at 535-36 (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974 (1932)).
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because of the "constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the
evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man." 10 4
Incrementalism is necessary, as the criminal law's deeper moral
implications make its development a complex undertaking, and this
development must take place locally: "This process of adjustment has
always been thought to be the province of the States.""" The states are
responsible for criminal law, then, both because diversity in jurisdiction
allows for different evolutions of a complicated area of law, and also
because the "nature of man" seems to be so bound up with moral
considerations that it is appropriately assessed by the government which
is closer to its citizens.
The Court made explicit its vision of diverse approaches to
different criminal law questions in an analogy made to the insanity
defense. Citing the D.C. Circuit's changing insanity rule, the Court
wrote that "[tihe experimentation of one jurisdiction in that field alone
indicates the magnitude of the problem."'0 6 Imposition of a uniform
principle across the states impedes innovation and diversity of
development: "[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not
eliminate, that fruitful experimentation, and freeze the developing
productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid
constitutional mold."' 07
The Court also professed anxiety over the prospect of developing a
robust body of substantive criminal law: "[I]t is difficult to see any
limiting principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming,
under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the
ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse
areas of the criminal law, throughout the country."'" Note the concern
with diversity of jurisdictions, and the important final clause a
preoccupation with geographic differences.
The federalism rationale thus looms large in Powell. It is perhaps
even more salient, though, in the concurrence by Justice Black, joined by
Justice Harlan.1o' He begins by noting that such constitutional regulation
of criminal law would be "a revolutionary doctrine of constitutional law
that would . . . tightly restrict state power to deal with a wide variety of

104.
105.
106.
States v.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 536.
Id
Id. (citing Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overnled by United
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 544-45 (Black, J., concurring).
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other harmful conduct.""o States need to deal with problems like crime,
and the Court would only get in the way."' Moreover, states solve the
problem of crime better than does a central government. Justice Black
wrote that "[p]erceptive students of history at an early date learned that
one country controlling another could do a more successful job if it
permitted the latter to keep in force the laws and rules of conduct which
it had adopted for itself."" 2
Part of this seems to be geographic for Justice Black. In an
extended passage, he discusses how the colonies on the east coast
eventually "crept cautiously westward."ll 3 "During all this period," he
wrote, "the Nation remembered that it could be more tranquil and
orderly if it functioned on the principle that the local communities
should control their own peculiarly local affairs under their own local
rules."" 4 Again, the peculiarity of a locality seems to be its climate
and terrain:
We are asked to tell the most-distant Islands of Hawaii that they cannot
apply their local rules so as to protect a drunken man on their beaches
and the local communities of Alaska that they are without power to
follow their own course in deciding what is the best way to take care of
a drunken man on their frozen soil. 115

Federalism is important, for Justice Black, because a drunk on the beach
is less of a problem than a drunk in a snow bank. The Court, Justice
Black warned, ought not to act "as a board of Platonic Guardians to
establish rigid, binding rules upon every small community in this large
Nation.""' Note the concern for distance and the size of the locality,
made even more explicit in the next line: "It is always time to say that
this Nation is too large, too complex and composed of too great a
diversity of peoples for any one of us to have the wisdom to establish the
rules by which local Americans must govern their local affairs."'
Here, we see a deeper justification for federalism that itself results
from disparate geography "diversity of peoples," which Justice Black
likely meant as culture. In concluding, Justice Black wrote that
this diversity meant that "experience in making local laws by local
110.

I11.

Id at 537.
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 190 (2005).

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Powell, 392 U.S. at 547 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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people themselves is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to
follow," and this was especially so in criminal law-the law most
concerned with "age-old questions of . .. ethical foundations and
practical effectiveness.""
D.

Patterson v. New York

The next major presentation of the federalism argument comes in
1976, in Patterson v. New York."' Patterson, like Powell, is another
leading representation of the "unfulfilled potential" narrative-it
narrowed the holding of a prior case, Mullaney, and upheld a New York
law placing the burden of proof for establishing a defense of extreme
emotional disturbance on the defendant.1 2 0
In Patterson,the analysis of the offense immediately begins with an
invocation of federalism: "It goes without saying that preventing and
dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of
the Federal Government, and that we should not lightly construe the
Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the
individual States."' 2 ' Accordingly, a state's "decision" in criminal law
will not be invalidated unless it violates fundamental norms-notice the
language of discretion and policy.1 22 This is reinforced later in the
opinion, where the Court notes that the rule makes prosecution easier,
and this is framed as New York's "choice." "If the State nevertheless
chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or
punishment," the Court wrote, "we think the State may assure itself that
the fact has been established with reasonably certainty." 2 3 In a footnote,
"choice" and "decision" become "policy," and policy choices are up
for disagreement:
The drafters of the Model Penal Code would, as a matter of policy,
place the burden of proving the nonexistence of most affirmative
defenses . . . on the prosecution once the defendant has come forward
with some evidence that the defense is present. The drafters recognize
the need for flexibility, however, and would, in "some exceptional
situations," place the burden of persuasion on the accused.1 24

118. Id. at 548.
119. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
120. Id. at 201. The defense had the effect of reducing a second-degree murder conviction to
that of manslaughter. Id. at 199 n.3.

121. Id. at 201 (citations omitted) (citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)
(plurality opinion)).

122. Id. at 201-02.
123. Id. at 209.
124. Id at 209 n.11.
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A state must be free to exercise its "judgment" with respect to how
"cumbersome," ".expensive," or "inaccurate" a given rule would be.12 5
Thus, the Court also cited Leland and noted that the Oregon insanity
rule, although singular amongst the various jurisdictions, did not violate
the Due Process Clause. 126 Flexibility and diversity-even if it results in
outliers-does not make the outlier invalid.
In concluding, the Court's preoccupation with federalism becomes
less subtle: "We thus decline to adopt [the proposed rule] as a
constitutional imperative, operative countrywide
."2
The reason
why "countrywide" rules are disfavored is set out in the important, and
much-quoted sentence: "Traditionally," the Court wrote, "due process
has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed;
more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused
have been left to the legislative branch."l 28 This sounds more like
separation of powers than federalism, but it is both. This deference is to
a specific level of legislature: the states. Patterson sets out the primary
theory of Due Process regulation of the criminal law-that it is minimal,
delineating only the very outer bounds of acceptability-and it justifies
this abdication of responsibility using federalism.
Like in Leland, Justice Powell's dissent in Patterson agrees on this
basic principle, it disagrees only in the principle's application:
The Court beats its retreat from Winship apparently because of a
concern that otherwise the federal judiciary will intrude too far into
substantive choices concerning the content of a State's criminal law.
The concern is legitimate, but misplaced. Winship and Mullaney are no
more than what they purport to be: decisions addressing the procedural
requirements that States must meet to comply with due process. They
are not outposts for policing the substantive boundaries of the
criminal law. 129
Again, even the dissenters agreed that the federal courts ought not
"intrude" into a state's criminal law and rejected the task of "policing the
boundaries" of substantive criminal law.' By the time of Powell, then,
the federalism rationale for Supreme Court deference in this area had
become an axiom that was no longer up for debate.

125. Id. at 209.
126. Id. at 204.
127. Id. at 210.
128.
129.

Id.
Id at 227-28 (Powell, J.. dissenting) (citations omitted).

I30. Id
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Rummel v. Estelle

"

Federalism was also featured prominently in the 1980 Eighth
Amendment case Rummel v. Estelle.13 ' In Rummel, the defendant was
sentenced to life in prison under Texas's recidivist statute, which
stipulated that "[w]hoever shall have been three times convicted of a
felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for
life in the penitentiary." 132 Rummel's three crimes were fraudulent use
of a credit card for more than $50, a check forgery of $28.36, and
obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses.3 3 He argued that a life sentence
was disproportionate for his offenses under the Eighth Amendment and
the Court rejected the claim.' 34 In making his challenge, the defendant
compared recidivist statutes amongst the states, noting the particular
severity of the Texas regime.1 35
The Court dismissed this line of argument by appealing to
federalism. Quoting Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent, the Court stated
that "our Constitution 'is made for people of fundamentally differing
views"' and it compared various peculiar laws amongst states such as
Arizona's crime against the theft of a homed animal, and California's
crime against theft of avocados.' 36 The Court noted that "[iun one State
theft of $100 will earn the offender a fine or a short term in jail; in
another State it could earn him a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment."
These seemingly absurd juxtapositions, though, served only to prove the
Court's point: states can do what they want. "Absent a constitutionally
imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism," the
Court wrote, "some State will always bear the distinction of treating
particular offenders more severely than any other State."' 3 8 This is
justified mostly because of imperfect knowledge as "[p]enologists
themselves have been unable to agree whether sentences should be light
or heavy, discretionary or determinate."' 39 Without a complete
understanding, states are best left to experimentation-"uncertainty
reinforces our conviction that any 'nationwide trend' toward [certain]

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE § 12.42 (West 1973)).
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 279-81.
Id. at 281-82 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).

137.
138.
139.

Id. at 282 (footnotes omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted).
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sentences must find its source and its sustaining force in the legislatures,
not in the federal courts."1 40

F. McMillan v. Pennsylvania
The next case to consider, McMillan v. Pennsylvania,14 was
decided in 1986.142 McMillan involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act,1 43 which required a minimum
sentence of five years imprisonment if the defendant "visibly possessed
a firearm" during the commission of an offense.1 44 This fact need only
have been established by a preponderance of the evidence.145 The
petitioner argued that, under the law of In re Winshipl 46 and Mullaney,
"if a State wants to punish visible possession of a firearm it must
undertake the burden of proving that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt." 4 71In other words, the factor was required to be listed as an
offense element.
In rejecting this claim, the Court invoked Patterson, and
emphasized that "Patterson rests on a premise . . . that preventing and

dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of
the Federal Government." 48 Like in Patterson,the Court also discussed
the burden of proof issue as a "choice" for the states:
While visible possession might well have been included as an element
of the enumerated offenses, Pennsylvania chose not to redefine
those offenses in order to so include it, and Patterson teaches that we
should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from

140. Id. at 283-84. Some scholars argue that Rummel has been overtaken by later cases, but
they admit that the case is still cited. See Youngjae Lee, The ConstitutionalRight Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 730 n.246 (2005) ("The continuing significance of Rummel today
is unclear. Solem, decided three years later, is impossible to square with Rummel. Neither is Rummel
consistent with the current position of the Supreme Court, which is that there is a narrow principle
of proportionality under the Eighth Amendment that has been valid since Weems and controls both
noncapital and capital cases. Although the case continues to be cited by the Court as good law,
much of the rationale of the opinion remains deeply at odds with the cases decided since then.").
141. 477 U.S. 79 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth v. McMillan, 567 A.2d 1043 (Pa.
1990).
142. See id. While this is ostensibly a sentencing case, it is discussed along with the guilt-stage
cases because the petitioners' argument was that the sentencing factor necessarily should have been
treated as a liability element. Id. at 87-90.
143. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1974), declared unconstitutional by Commonwealth v.
Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa. 2014).
144. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80-81 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(a)).
145. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b).
146. 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970).
147. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
148. Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
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pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and
prescribing penalties. 149

Once we are in the realm of "choice," state laws are immunized
from constitutional invalidation.'s After observing that many states have
included weapon possession as offense elements, the Court wrote,
"[T]he fact that the States have formulated different statutory schemes to
punish armed felons is merely a reflection of our federal system," which
demands "[t]olerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with a
common problem of law enforcement.""'5 While the Patterson Court
observed that disparity amongst rules would not invalidate outliers, in
McMillan this disparity is almost lauded.'
G.

Martin v. Ohio

The next year, in 1987, the Court decided Martin v. Ohio,'5 3 in
which the petitioner challenged the Ohio statute placing the burden of
establishing self-defense on the defendant.1 54 The Court upheld
the law.' 55
In coming to this conclusion, the opinion frequently invoked
federalism.'15 It cited Patterson, saying, "We there emphasized the
preeminent role of the States in preventing and dealing with crime and
the reluctance of the Court to disturb a State's decision with respect to
the definition of criminal conduct and the procedures by which the
criminal laws are to be enforced in the courts."'5 Martin actually
strengthens the claim of Patterson:criminal law was called "the business
in the earlier case, but later the States are called
of the States"'
"preeminent."
"do it better."

59

It is not just that states "do" criminal law, but that they

149. Id. at 86.
150. See DUBBER, supra note I11, at 180-81. The language of state "choice" is also used later
in the opinion: "That Pennsylvania's particular approach has been adopted in few other States does
not render Pennsylvania's choice unconstitutional." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90.

151.
152.

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 566 (1967)).
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977). Interestingly, the dissent in

McMillan was authored by Justice Marshall-the same justice who wrote Patterson. See McMillan,
477 U.S. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote that the issue in the case "is a
question that must be decided by this Court and cannot be abdicated to the States." Id.

153. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
154. Id. at 230.
155. Id. at 236.
156.
157.

See id. at 232, 236.
Id. at 232 (citing Patterson,432 U.S. at 201-02).

158. Patterson,432 U.S. at 201.
159. Martin, 480 U.S. at 232.
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Martin is also another example of a case where the dissent sheds
light on the larger terms of debate-and here-it is federalism. Justice
Powell, like prior dissenters, was forced to accept the basic premise:
"I agree, of course, that States must have substantial leeway in defining
their criminal laws and administering their criminal justice systems.""'
Moreover, he focused repeatedly on the issue of state deference, and
described the majority's ruling as being motivated by "its willingness to
defer to the State's legislative definitions of crimes and defenses.""'
Justice Powell's dissent, given its focus on the limits of federalism, gives
us a window into the importance of that rationale for the majority.
H.

Harmelin v. Michigan

The 1991 case Harmelin v. Michigan,16 2 is another important
presentation of the federalism argument-like Rummel, in the context
of sentencing.'16 The petitioner in Harmelin was sentenced to
life incarceration without parole for the possession of less than
700 grams of cocaine, and he argued that this sentence was
unconstitutionally disproportionate.'1 6
The plurality opinion relied on the federalism rationale invoked by
Rummel. After quoting that case, the plurality elaborated further:
Diversity not only in policy, but in the means of implementing policy,
is the very raison d'etre of our federal system. Though the different
needs and concerns of other States may induce them to treat simple
possession of 672 grams of cocaine as a relatively minor offense
nothing in the Constitution requires Michigan to follow suit. The
Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary consensus on
leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional
maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and
responding to changed social conditions.1 65
States ought to be able to punish the same conduct differently
because each jurisdiction may have "different needs and concerns," and
also because thoughts on punishment can change, thus making uniform
national rules undesirable.
Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence also emphasized
federalism. "[M]arked divergences both in underlying theories of

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 241 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 240-41, 243-44.
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
Id. at 990; id. at 999-1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id at 961 (majority opinion).

165.

Id. at 990 (citations omitted).
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sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the
inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure," he wrote. 6 6
Here, disparity is not a byproduct, but a desirable result. Quoting another
case, Justice Kennedy asserted, "Our federal system recognizes the
independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through
criminal law."' 6 ' This morality-laden aspect of federalism is especially
relevant in sentencing law:
State sentencing schemes may embody different penological
assumptions, making interstate comparison of sentences a difficult and
imperfect enterprise. And even assuming identical philosophies,
differing attitudes and perceptions of local conditions may yield
different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the appropriate length of
prison terms for particular crimes. Thus, the circumstance that a State
has the most severe punishment for a particular crime does not by itself
render the punishment grossly disproportionate.1 68
Different jurisdictions are allowed, and expected, to have different
views about the punitive upshots for the same conduct, both because of
differing views of the purposes of punishment and because of differing
applications of the same purpose to local conditions.
I.

Medina v. California

Moving forward to 1992, we turn to Medina v. California.'69 In

Medina, the petitioner challenged a California law placing the burden to
prove mental competency to stand trial on the defendant."o Rejecting the
contention that the Mathews v. Eldridgel7 ' test applied to criminal
proceedings, the Court instead applied Pattersonand quoted the familiar
line: "It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime
is much more the business of the States than it is of the
Federal Government .. . and that we should not lightly construe the
Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the
individual States."' 72
Medina adds some new considerations, though, which the Court
believed were "suggest[ed]" by Patterson. "[B]ecause the States have
considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
197,201

Id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)).
Id. at 999-1000 (citations omitted) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281 (1991)).
505 U.S. 437 (1992).
Id. at 442.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (citations omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
(1977)).
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process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition," the Court
wrote, "it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative
judgments in this area." 1 73 This is an echo of the "common-lawfederalism" amalgam discussed earlier in Powell, in which
experimentation and the localism of mores worked to justify deference
to states.1 74 Here, it is the "expertise" of the states that is highlightedexpertise undoubtedly gained because of the "centuries" of development
that formed the common law. Medina notes that this practice of
deference means that the "less intrusive" test is the appropriate test for
due process in criminal law-not that of Mathews. 7 1
J.

Montana v. Egelhoff

In 1996 the Court decided Montana v. Egelhoff,7 6 a case in which
the following state law was challenged: "[Voluntary intoxication] may
not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental
state that is an element of [the criminal] offense." 7 7 Egelhoff is
complicated, and produced only a plurality opinion with a controlling
concurrence by Justice Ginsburg. Both opinions contain federalismbased themes.
Following an extended analysis of the common law's position on
voluntary intoxication, the plurality chose to end its opinion with a
flourish discussing federalism. First, the opinion quoted the important
line from Powell regarding the debate about the "nature of man" as "the
province of the states."' 7 8 Next, the language of state "choice" was
invoked: "The people of Montana have decided to resurrect the rule of
an earlier era, disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication when
a defendant's state of mind is at issue. Nothing in the Due Process
Clause prevents them from doing so . . . .""' Here we see a more explicit
connection drawn between "state policy" federalism and the concept of
democratic legitimacy-it is "the people" of the state who chose, and
this democratic wellspring is framed as in opposition to the Constitution.
Expansive interpretations of the Due Process Clause would "prevent[]"
the "people" from making their "deci[sion]."so

173. Id. at 445-46. Here, the Court is not talking about criminal "procedure" in the Fourth
Amendment sense.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-37 (1968).
Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46.
518 U.S. 37 (1996).
Id. at 39-40 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1973)).
Id. at 56 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 536).
Id.
Id
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Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, too, contains lineaments of the
federalism rationale. She noted that "States enjoy wide latitude in
defining the elements of criminal offenses," and cited Martin.'"' She
then wrote that this was especially the case when determining "the
extent to which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction
of a crime."12 Moreover, she cited to a Pennsylvania case in which that
court referenced Powell's "nature of man" quotation.'
K.

Washington v. Glucksberg

The next case to consider was decided in 1997, Washington v.
Glucksberg,'" and addressed a Washington State assisted suicide
offense.' The Court held that the crime did not violate the Due Process
Clause, relying mostly on the long history of suicide bans in
American law."'
After turning from its historical discussion, though, the Court
invoked federalism themes. The Court noted that "[p]ublic concern and
democratic action are . . . sharply focused" on end-of-life issues, and that

therefore "the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful
examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues.""
While not stating it explicitly, the opinion lauded the state-level
experimentation anticipated by Powell.
Justice Souter's concurrence was more direct. In comparing
legislative competencies with those of the judiciary, he wrote that
[I]egislatures, on the other hand, have superior opportunities to obtain
the facts necessary for a judgment about the present controversy. Not
only do they have more flexible mechanisms for factfinding than the
Judiciary, but their mechanisms include the power to experiment,
moving forward and pulling back as facts emerge within their own
jurisdictions. There is, indeed, good reason to suppose that in the
absence of a judgment for respondents here, just such experimentation
will be attempted in some of the States. 88

181. Id. at 58 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987)).
182. Id. (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 545).
183. Id. at 59 (first quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 536; and then citing Commonwealth v.
Rumsey, 454 A.2d 1121, 1122 (1983)). Note, however, that deference to the "State" here ironically
did not translate into deference to a State high court.

184. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
185. Id. at 705-06.
186. Id. at 706-07, 710-19.
187. Id. at 716, 719.
188.

Id. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Like in Leland, this was not just a separation of powers
observation, but also one of federalism. The experimentation will take
place among "jurisdictions"-plural-and it was happening in "some of
the States.""'
L.

Ewing v. California

In 2003, the Court decided the most recent case that refused to
strike down a sentencing scheme on Eighth Amendment grounds: Ewing
v. California.'90 Ewing involved a proportionality challenge to
California's "three strikes" law-a recidivist statute designed to
"protect[] the public safety by providing lengthy prison terms for
habitual felons."l 91
The plurality opinion approved Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in Harmelin, including his observations about the "beneficial, result[s]
of the federal structure."' 92 However, the plurality also added
new thoughts:
Throughout the States, legislatures enacting three strikes laws made a
deliberate policy choice that individuals who have repeatedly engaged
in serious or violent criminal behavior . .. must be isolated from
society in order to protect the public safety. Though three strikes laws
may be relatively new, our tradition of deferring to state legislatures in
making and implementing such important policy decisions is
longstanding.... Our traditional deference to legislative policy
choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution "does not
mandate adoption of any one penological theory." . . . A sentence can

have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence,
retribution, or rehabilitation. . . . Some or all of these justifications may
play a role in a State's sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing
rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures,
not federal courts. 193
Here, again, we see the rhetoric of state "policy" and "choice"
invoked, and its resultant implication-deference to state legislatures.

189.
190.

191.
192.
538 U.S.
193.

Id.
538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 14-15.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Ewing,
at 24-25 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
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Clark v. Arizona

In 2006 the Court decided the last case we must consider: Clark v.
Arizona. 94 The law at issue in Clark eliminated "cognitive incapacity"
as a type of insanity excuse-when an actor is "unable to understand
what he is doing."'95 It also restricted the consideration of insanity
evidence to the question of the defense, eliminating its bearing on
mens rea elements.
The majority opinion, by Justice Souter, is very long and
extensively reasoned, and the federalism rationale makes notable
appearances. In discussing the formulation of the insanity rule-the first
aspect of the challenge noted above-the Court noted, "[T]he insanity
rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open
to state choice.""' This is especially true in the case of insanity, where
medical science and legal defenses are "subject to flux and
disagreement."' 9 7 When there is "fodder for reasonable debate . . . due
process imposes no single canonical formulation."' 98 Here the Court
reiterated the familiar language of state "choice," and echoed the
experimentation rationale which was first fully discussed in Powellnearly forty years prior.199
In discussing the state court's restriction of insanity evidence to the
defense elements, these themes of choice and experimentation reoccur.
The Court stated that Arizona had "authority to define" the defense "by
choosing an insanity definition. "200 Later, the Court wrote that "[i]t bears
repeating that not every State will find it worthwhile to make the
judgment Arizona has made, and the choices the States do make about
dealing with the risks posed by mental-disease and capacity evidence
will reflect their varying assessments ... as expressed in choices of
insanity rules." 20' Experimentation requires choice, and this will result in
disparity across jurisdictions.
N.

Summary

Beginning in 1952 with Leland and ending in 2006 with Clark, we
have walked through the story of federalism as an argument against

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

548 U.S. 735 (2006), aff'dsub nom. Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 742.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 752; see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968).
Clark, 548 U.S. at 771.
Id. at 778 (footnote omitted).
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constitutional limits on criminal law. What we found was a consistent
invocation of various themes such as the importance of state policy
choices, experimentation amongst jurisdictions, state expertise and
preeminence in criminal law, and diversity in societal norms.
While federalism was not the only force in play when the Court refused
to invalidate the laws discussed above, it was an important and
enduring one.202
IV.

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS

The task ahead is to assess whether federalism deserves the status it
has obtained in the criminal law context. However, to answer this
question we first need a more precise understanding of what is meant by
federalism, and why it is or is not beneficial in criminal cases.
Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feely write that federalism is a
"broad political or legal term[]" and "can mean many different
things."203 Because of this, it is important to say what "federalism" we
are speaking about-what is the "federalism" discussed in the above
cases? The federalism we are concerned with is federal judicial
deference to state institutions-both legislatures and courts-in the area
of criminal law, taking its form as a narrow interpretation of certain
constitutional provisions. But while federalism is this practice, it is also
an argument that justifies the practice. Thus, it makes sense to speak of
the Court as deferring to states "because of federalism" just as much as it
is to say that that deference is itself "federalism." We are concerned with
both the practice and the argument.
The reasons why this is thought to be a beneficial practice or
system have often been referred to as federalism's "values." 204 Often,
these are assumed away and not thoroughly examined. As Barry
Friedman observes, "[E]ven familiar arguments for federalism are
202. For a very broad outline of the typical arguments used to resist "substantive due process"
regulation of law, see Justice Harlan's concurrence in Griswold, where federalism is but one of a
number of reasons:
Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about in the 'due process' area by
the historically unfounded incorporation formula long advanced by my Brother BLACK,
and now in part espoused by my Brother STEWART. It will be achieved in this area, as in
other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of
history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers
have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
203.

Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a NationalNeurosis, 41

UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994): see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 499, 504 & n.32 (1995).
204. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 404-05 (1997).
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remarkably poorly developed in the literature. Instead, we tend to utter
these reasons as slogans, without thinking through them or testing
them."20 5 Erwin Chemerinsky lodges this critique at the Court as well:
[O]f all the areas of constitutional law, discussions about federalism
are the ones where the underlying values are least discussed and are the
most disconnected from the legal doctrines.

. .

. [W]here in federalism

cases is there any careful exploration of why state autonomy matters
and how it is undermined by specific federal actions? 206
While there is no exhaustive or authoritative list of the justifications
for federalism, Heather Gerken writes that there is a "healthy
pluralism."20 7 The Supreme Court has repeatedly mentioned six major
values. The canonical listing comes from the 1991 case Gregory v.
Ashcroft,208 which stated the following:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will
be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and
it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on
abuses of government power. 209
Twenty years later, in Bond v. United States, the Court re-affirmed
Gregory's catalogue, but made explicit an additional value-the

205. Id. Heather Gerken believes that this may be because the central debates about federalism
are the implementation of the values. "Federalism theory has long exhibited a healthy pluralism
with regard to the ends federalism promotes. . . . The Supreme Court reels off these arguments as
easily as scholars do. The divide in federalism debates centers on the means necessary to achieve
those ends." Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552-53
(2012) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Gerken, Our Federalism(s)]; see Heather K. Gerken,
Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1891 (2013) [hereinafter
Gerken, New Nationalism] ("Supporters of conventional federalism have a ready list of reasons why
states matter. Federalism promotes choice, fosters competition, facilitates participation, enables
experimentation, and wards off a national Leviathan.").

206.

Chemerinsky, supra note 203, at 501-02.

207.

Gerken, Our Federalism(s),supra note 205, at 1552.

208.

501 U.S. 452 (1991).

209. Id. at 458 (citations omitted). Interestingly, the Court also cites to two law review articles
for the same proposition, first citing Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); and then citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)). The arguments
contained in these articles flesh out the statements in the opinion, but do not seem to add anything
new to them.
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"integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States . . [as] an end
in itself, to ensure that States function as political entities in their
own right." 2 o These, then, are the generally accepted values of
federalism, listed in rough order of importance2 ": (1) maximization of
individual liberty through checks on government power (the "principal
benefit"); (2) experimentation and innovation across jurisdictions;
(3) responsiveness to geographic diversity; (4) democratic participation,
(5) competition for citizens; and (6) inherent sovereignty.
Before assessing the validity of these values as reasons for judicial
restraint in the area of constitutional criminal law, more should be said
about each. However, as the cases in the previous section reveal, only
two of these values are regularly used by the Court in the criminal
context: societal diversity and jurisdictional experimentation. Since these
are the expressed justifications for resisting a constitutional criminal law,
they will be addressed first, and more fully.
A.

Experimentation-BasedFederalism

As we saw in the line of criminal cases above, the first and
most common justification of federalism is efficiency through
experimentation. The efficiency of federalism in turn seems to have two
sub-parts: (1) it is more efficient to allow different jurisdictions to
experiment with different approaches than to impose a uniforn rule; and
(2) localities better understand their own problems, and therefore can
tailor legal solutions more effectively.
The genesis of Experimentation Federalism, at least from reading
2
string citations, is New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.m
This case involved
a Lochner-era, substantive due process invalidation of an Oklahoma

210. 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 584 (2009).
211. The order of importance is based on statements made by the Court, or on how frequently
each is used.
212. Note that academic literature generally agrees with this formulation. See Gerken, Our
Federalism(y),supra note 205, at 1552-53 n.6 (first citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59: then citing
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUF 75-106 (1995): then citing Akhil Reed Amar, Five
Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1229 (1994): then citing
Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51
DUKE L.J. 75, 136-39 (2001); then citing Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers ": In Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774-79 (1995);
then citing Merritt, supra note 209, at 3-10; then citing Emest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53-63 (2004); and then citing Michael W. McConnell, supra

note 209, at 1493-1511).
213. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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statute criminalizing ice manufacture without a license.214 What is
remembered, though, is this passage from Justice Brandeis's dissent:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 215
This passage would be cited by countless other opinions invoking
Experimentation Federalism ("Experimentation Federalism (1)"), and
the language of state "experimentation" made its way into many of the
criminal cases discussed earlier. This was most explicitly referenced in
Powell: "[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not
eliminate, that fruitful experimentation, and freeze [it] into a rigid
constitutional mold." 216 This was also apparent in Rummel, where the
Court noted that "[p]enologists themselves have been unable to agree"
on appropriate punishments, and that in this context of "uncertainty," it
was the place of the "legislatures" to continue experimentation. 2 17
Sympathetic commentators write that federalism "promote[s] the
Speaking
more
administration." 2 18
efficiency
of government
as
Experimentation
Federalism
Susan
Klein
summarizes
dispassionately,
follows: "The first version of federalism seeks to preserve local control
of the criminal-justice system and to foster diversity and
experimentation that might improve efficiency in areas where there is
nationwide agreement as to general goals, though perhaps not as to the
best means for achieving those goals." 219 Klein's formulation adds an
important nuance-this federalism is normally invoked only with respect
to policy means (not ends), and only when the policy ends are somewhat
agreed upon by all. As Barry Friedman writes, "Countless state and local
governments, remote from one another but facing similar problems,
develop numerous twists on solving them."2 2 0

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 271-72, 278-80.
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968).
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1980).

218. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope ofNational Power Vis-a- Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1614 (1977) (noting that the purpose of federalism is "to
promote the efficiency of government administration").
219. Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541,

1541-42 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
220.

Friedman, supranote 204, at 399-400 (footnote omitted).
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The
second
type
of Experimentation-based
Federalism
("Experimentation Federalism (2)") is a recognition of the superiority of
local knowledge. This was implied by Medina when the Court spoke
about the "considerable expertise" of States in criminal law issues, and
by Martin when the role of the States was described as
"preeminent." 2 2 1 As Geoffrey Moulton, Jr. writes, "The great insight of
federalism is that different levels of government have different
competencies, and that wisely allocating responsibilities to those
different levels of government can work significant benefits in terms
of ... governmental efficiency. "222
In sum, Experimentation Federalism is the argument that localized
legal decision making is beneficial because (1) it allows for interjurisdictional experimentation with respect to the means of achieving
shared goals; and (2) it places authority in the jurisdiction that has
superior knowledge-by
virtue of its size. 22 3 Decentralized
experimentation is seen as more "efficient" than the imposition of a
uniform national rule, which would need to be repeatedly updated by
Congress or the Supreme Court to fix its weaknesses. Experimentation
Federalism presupposes that legal rules will not "get it right" the first
time, and will inevitably need revision. The argument also assumes that
there is a range of rules to solve a given problem-that there is not only
one "right way," and that the states will effectively "compare notes"
with each other.224 Moreover, it is assumed that smaller governments

221. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232
(1987).
222. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Searchfor a Judicially Enforceable Federalism,
83 MINN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1999). Trust in state expertise is also present in Justice White's dissent
in Robinson v. California, which outlawed status crimes: "I fail to see why the Court deems it more
appropriate to write into the Constitution its own abstract notions of how best to handle the
narcotics problem, for it obviously cannot match either the States or Congress in expert

understanding." 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). Given that the States are placed
alongside Congress, though, Justice White may have meant more that legislatures had expertise
courts did not.
223. Friedman adds nuance to this argument, but this does not seem to be based on arguments
made in cases, certainly not criminal cases:
There are essentially two common, related theories of federalism based upon efficiency.
The first theory, "decentralization," makes the point that when power is diffused,
different governments can adopt a mix of policies that meet the preferences of different
citizens, thus maximizing the way in which government as a whole satisfies individual
preferences. The second theory, "competition," argues that citizens will vote with their
feet by moving to jurisdictions that maximize their individual preferences.
Friedman, supra note 204, at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
224. Recent scholarship informed by public choice theory argues that there may be a downside
to "comparing notes," in that political actors may learn bad lessons from each other about how to
manipulate interest groups, institutions, and the electorate. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of
Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 636 (2017) ("[L]eaming can also occur along a political
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know the peculiarities of their own problems better than a distant
bureaucracy. They are more responsive to knowledge-inputs from
the local citizenry, and are also run by officials who live in the
given locality.
B.

Morality-BasedFederalism

The second major justification for deference to states that the Court
has used in the context of criminal law is societal diversity: smaller,
more local jurisdictions will be "more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society." 225 One scholar describes this as the ability to
create the "type of social and political climate [citizens] prefer." 226 For
our purposes-discussing, as we are, the imposition of state
punishment-the relevant "diversity" here is moral diversity. It is
differing views about what is and what is not worthy of punishment.
This version of federalism holds that law-making should reflect a
community's moral consensus, and that therefore the more tightly a legal
jurisdiction can map onto a moral community, the better. 227 This
rationale appears less often, and less forcefully, than does
Experimentation Federalism. But Morality Federalism is still important.
It takes center stage in the oft-quoted line from Powell: federalism
in criminal law is valuable because of the "constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law
and [the] changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of
the nature of man."228 Surely more is meant here than efficiency-this is
about contestable moral propositions that are not resolvable with policybased arguments. 2 29 Justice Black's concurrence in Powell hints at this
as well when he speaks of "diversity of peoples," meaning diversity of
cultures. 230 This is especially implicated by criminal law, which is
dimension as information about ideological preferences, campaign techniques, and electoral
incentives is revealed. Both types of information can be put to use in the policy arena by a host of
individual and institutional actors that have a wide range of motives, from a public-spirited concem
for the general welfare to a desire to maximize personal financial returns. . . . [D]ecentralization can
lead to the overproduction of socially harmful information.").

225. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991)).
226.

Merritt, supra note 209, at 8.

227.
228.

See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968).
Id. at 536.

229. As John Rawls observed, "[A] basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable
pluralism-the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious,
philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free institutions." John Rawls, The

Idea ofPublic Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 766 (1997).
230. Powell, 392 U.S. at 547-48 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black also invoked these
themes when he was on the dissenting side in In re Winship stating:
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concerned with "age-old questions" of the law's "ethical foundations
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
and practical effectiveness." 3
Harmelin is also replete with this theme, and recognizes "the
independent power of a State to articulate societal nonrs through
criminal law."

232

Klein describes this value-laden variant of federalism as
"foster[ing] a community's expression of morality." 23 3 Friedman, too,
describes one of the "values" of federalism to be "cultural diversity":
"[T]here is some substance to this idea of diversity, substance that
cannot be taken into account through national legislation." 2 34
Importantly, this expression of local morality can be both rights-enabling
and rights-restricting.2 35 Friedman gives the examples of drinking ages,
speed limits, and gun usage. 2 36 Firearm possession is an excellent
example of the dual nature of Morality Federalism: some states
aggressively punish possession of certain types of firearms, while other
states actively protect the conduct through legislation.237
Putting together rights-enabling and rights-restricting scenarios, we
can synthesize a more generally applicable description of Morality
Federalism: the moral views of a jurisdiction ought to be instantiated in
that jurisdiction's criminal law because (1) the people in that community
hold those moral beliefs; and (2) it is these people who will be required
to live under whatever law they enact. It is within the jurisdiction that
criminal law is created and where it applies. Therefore, if law should
reflect moral viewpoints, law is most appropriately made at the smallest
jurisdictional level. As Bilionis argues, "[C]riminal law is most
responsive to the people who require its protection and who must live
under its force when it is fashioned and maintained at the state level,"
It can be, and has been, argued that when this Court strikes down a legislative act
because it offends the idea of "fundamental fairness," it furthers the basic thrust of our
Bill of Rights by protecting individual freedom. But that argument ignores the effect of
such decisions on perhaps the most fundamental individual liberty of our people-the
right of each man to participate in the self-govemment of his society.
397 U.S. 358, 384-85 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). For Justice Black, it is the liberty to participate
and legislate that mattered --the "liberty of government," which allowed the "States . . to be left
free to govern themselves in accordance with their own views of faimess and decency." Id. at 385.
231. Powell, 392 U.S. at 548 (Black, J., concurring).
232. Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J.. concurring) (citation
omitted).
233. Klein, supra note 219, at 1542.
234. Friedman, supra note 204, at 401-02.
235. Klein seems to take into account only rights-enabling localism, but this misses half the
picture. See Klein, supra note 219, at 1579-83.
236. Friedman, suvpra note 204, at 402.
237. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00 (McKinney 1965); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02
(West 2011).
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and moreover, "[f]ederalism invites a decentralized disposition of issues
that, if addressed at a national level, would spark peculiar divisiveness
because of their myriad local implications." 3 8
Morality Federalism, like Experimentation Federalism, is built on
various assumptions-two of which are somewhat controversial. First,
of course, is that it is true or valid that criminal law should reflect
morality. This implicates a classic debate in legal theory.23 9 The
argument also assumes a descriptive claim that moral viewpoints will
very often be concentrated geographically and along jurisdictional
boundaries. While this may seem intuitively true, this is hotly debated by
scholars. 240 The issues surrounding these two assumptions will be
addressed later.24 1
C.

Liberty-BasedFederalism

Having finished the discussion of the two primary values of
federalism invoked by the Supreme Court in constitutional criminal
cases, we now turn to federalism's values more generally. Because these
are not explicitly used by the Court in the earlier cases, though, they will
be addressed in less depth.
We begin with a value that is generally called federalism's
"principal benefit" by the Court: the preservation of individual liberty
through the creation of dual sovereigns that check each other.242 "[A]
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government," wrote the Court in Gregory, "will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front." 243 The Court then quoted
Alexander Hamilton's observation that "[p]ower [is] almost always the
rival of power," and that "[i]f [the people's] rights are invaded by either
[government], they can make use of the other as the instrument of
238. Bilionis, supra note 47, at 1303-04: see also Roderick M. Hills. Jr., Federalism as
Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 769, 770 (2006) (describing federalism as means of
devolving contentious moral decisions to local level so as to "defus[e] deep disagreements").

239. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 75 (1995)
(discussing so-called "Hart-Devlin Debate").
240. Compare Guido Calabresi & Eric S. Fish, Federalism and Moral Disagreement, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2016) ("Who can doubt the deep geographic divide, in America, of moral
attitudes with respect to guns, abortion, capital punishment, gay marriage, religious
fundamentalism, assisted suicide, and more."), and Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral
Compass of State Constitutionalism, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 849, 861 (1999) (calling states "distinct
societies"), with JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005) (noting lack of distinctive identities due to "the ease and
frequency of mobility; [and] the dominance of mass media and mass marketing of national scope").

241. See infra Part VI.A.2.a, A.3.b.
242. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
243. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss2/6

38

Fissell: Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law

FEDERALISMAND CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

2017]

527

redress." 244 Liberty Federalism, then, is the argument that creating
competing vehicles of political will empowers the citizenry in
controlling those institutions, and prevents one from becoming
preeminent and overweening.245
One aspect of this deserves emphasis: it is primarily the liberty of
the individual citizens that is sought to be maximized, not the liberty of
the State qua institution. As the Court wrote in New York v. United
States,246 "The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities .... To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals."247
Liberty Federalism presumes that states and the federal government
will act in tension, and not in concert, when it comes to personal
freedoms. There is evidence of this happening-say, with state
legalization of marijuana possession or, before Obergefell, allowing gay
marriage.248 However, there are also examples of cooperative restrictions
on liberty-for example, the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA"),24 9 which empowered states to refuse to recognize other
states' gay marriages. 25 0 Liberty Federalism is most problematic, and
perhaps entirely inapplicable in the context of the criminalization power.
It is not obvious that, by creating two different entities with the ability to
proscribe individual conduct, personal freedom is increased. Part VI
further discusses this.251

244.

Id. at 458-59 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton)).

245.
246.
247.
248.

See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221-22 (2011), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 181.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-97 (2015) (discussing prior same-sex

legalizations).

249. Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at I U.S.C. § 7, and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). In 2013,
the Supreme Court held that DOMA was unconstitutional. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-96.

250.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (discussing DOMA). Moreover, it is not obvious that

smaller jurisdictions will be more protective of individual liberty. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Does
Federalism Advance Libertv?. 47 WAYNE L. REv. 911, 927 (2001) ("The argument then must be
that a government that is more responsive to the people will be one that better protects liberty. But
this premise is highly questionable; it assumes that popular sentiment is likely to be rights
progressive rather than rights regressive. To the extent that voters at the state and local level prefer
rights regressive legislation--or more likely a rule that abuses a particular minority group--greater
responsiveness increases the dangers of government tyranny.").

251.

See infra Part VI.B.L
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Federalism
Democratic Participation-Based

Another value of federalism is that, because it creates smaller
government, "it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes."252 Deborah Merritt helpfully sketches out why
such involvement is desirable: "[I]t trains citizens in the techniques of
democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and
enhances voter confidence in the democratic process."253 Similarly,
Michael McConnell notes that the founders saw federalism as enhancing
an essential "public spiritedness," since "participation in deliberation
over the public good" was more accessible in states than in a remote
central government.2 54 What we can call "Participation Federalism,"
then, is the argument that for multiple reasons it is beneficial for citizens
in a democracy to be engaged in political processes, and that this is
facilitated by smaller units of lawmaking.
Participation Federalism makes the values of federalism
synonymous with the values of democracy. " Because of this,
participation is one of the most coherent reasons for supporting the
system of dual sovereignty. If the features of a democracy are esteemed
in this country-primarily, citizen involvement in self-governmentthen an institutional structure that helps advance those features ought
also to be esteemed. In the context of criminal law, Participation
Federalism tracks closely with the concerns of morality federalism, but
adds a process-based riff: local morality should determine what conduct
is and is not punished in a locality, but the smaller the locality, the better
the opportunities for citizens to make their moral viewpoints known. The
same level of citizen participation and impact is more implausible in the
federal context.
E.

Mobile Citizeny-BasedFederalism

A fifth value of federalism that is mentioned by the Court and
commentators, although not in the criminal context, is the notion that
federalism enables "voting with one's feet." 256 The Court wrote in its
252. Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
253. Merritt, supra note 209, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
254. McConnell, supra note 209, at 1510; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right
to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888. 889 (2006) (arguing that
"federalism itself is an individual right because it provides an accessible mechanism by which
laypeople can influence the scope of their rights").
255. For more on the values of democratic theory see STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP. VIRTUF, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (Oxford University
1990).
256. Friedman, supra note 204, at 387; see Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221-22
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canonical discussion of federalism that the existence of sub-national
governmental units "makes government 'more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry."' 2 57 The Court cited to
McConnell,25 8 who connected this value back to liberty stating that the
"[o]ppressive measures at the state level are easier to avoid." 2 59
However, the Court's invocation of mobility seems more nuancedmobility leads to competition, and in turn more "responsive"
government. Different legal jurisdictions are conceptualized as different
products in a larger market for law and government, with citizens as the
freely-choosing consumers. Presumably, as in a normal market,
competition between the "suppliers"-states-will drive down the
"prices" and makes the "products" better. 260 This theory finds its
intellectual genesis in the well-known work of political economist
Charles Tiebout. 26 1

Mobility Federalism in the context of criminal law is an attractive
theory. Citizens wishing to leave a state with objectionable criminal laws
can escape their application by re-locating; citizens wishing to live in a
place where certain conduct is punished, for whatever reason, can do the
same. In the aggregate, this movement is expected to serve as a
consensus signal to the state governments more generally, pointing them
to the better decisions in criminal lawmaking. A contemporary example
of exodus from an undesirable legal regime can be seen in the move
away from jurisdictions that criminalize marijuana possession and use
into those that have legalized it.26 2 Conversely, mobility due to the
(2011), rev d, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
257. Bond. 564 U.S. at 221 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458).
258. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (citing McConnell, supra note 209).
259. McConnell, supra note 209, at 1503.
260.

Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems: The Role of

Political and Financial Constraints, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 3,

11-12 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) ("In the same way as different types of
individuals choose different shopping centers that provide varying mixes of products and services,
under decentralization these individuals will choose (by deciding where to live) different types of
communities that provide varying mixes of public services.").
261. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 3. POL. EcoN. 416, 419-20
(1956). In 1956, Tiebout hypothesized that although the provision of public goods by governments
was traditionally thought to work outside normal economic principles, in a system with different
geographic jurisdictions and porous borders, citizen mobility enabled the functioning of a market:
"Moving or failing to move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and reveals
the consumer-voter's demand for public goods." Id. at 420.
262. See Marijuana Refugees: Looking.for a New Homes in Pot-Legal States, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 5, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/marijuana-refugees-lookingnew-homes-pot-legal-states-n22781. According to one news site, in 2015, the Colorado Health
Department reported that eighty percent of all new citizens reported moving to Colorado because of
marijuana legalization. See According to a New Stwyev, 4 out of Every 5 People Move to Colorado
/br Marijuana, DENVER CITY PAGE, http://www.imfromdenver.com/according-to-a-new-survey-4-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6

[Vol. 46:489

H1OFSTRA LAW REVIEW

530

attractiveness of criminalization is likely illustrated by citizens seeking
out places that are more "tough on crime" to feel safer.26 3
Mobility Federalism is predicated on a number of assumptions,
though, most important being (1) the ability of citizens to actually
move;264 and (2) that states are incentivized to compete for larger
populations, and will shape their policies accordingly. 4?The theory
would be of little value if only the rich could escape the
onerous criminal regime, or if the state criminalized without regard for
citizen movement.
F.

Inherent Sovereignty-Based Federalism

Last to consider is the "value" of federalism least mentioned by the
Court-perhaps because it seems to be less of a normative justification
than a descriptive explanation: the residual sovereignty of the states.
This is the theory that the historic fact of state sovereignty, altered only
by the ratification of the Constitution, but largely preserved by the Tenth
Amendment, is itself a "reason" for federalism. Sovereignty Federalism
eschews the search for the system's benefits, though, and instead treats
federalism as intrinsically worthwhile. 266
While earlier cases suggested that the value of federalism was
instrumental to individual liberty,m in Bond the Court made clear that
while federalism was not "just an end in itself," it was also valuable for
its own sake: "The allocation of powers in our federal system preserves
the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States. The federal

out-of-every-5-people-move-to-colorado-for-marijuana (last visited Feb. 15. 2018).
263. For Doron Teichman's theory, see infra notes 391-95 and accompanying text. He posits
that, given the "goal of encouraging crime migration," states may respond by "gradually
harshen[ing] their criminal justice system" so as to "rais[e] the price of committing a crime within
it." Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831, 1834 (2005).
264. Tiebout, supra note 261, at 419. Tiebout calls it an "assumption" that "[c]onsumer-voters
are fully mobile and will move to that community where their preference patterns . . . are best

satisfied." Id.
265. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.. Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal
Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 73, 130-32 (1997) ("Unlike a unitary national government, which reduces
choice and is relatively unaffected by competition, state governments have an incentive to
implement policies that not only maximize utility for a majority of voters already in the state but
also serve to attract additional taxpayers." (footnote omitted)).

266.
267.

Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221-22 (2011), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citation omitted). This was only

recently made explicit by the Supreme Court. Earlier, in New York v. United States, the Court
emphasized the ultimate aim of preserving liberty: "State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
'Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign

power."' Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun,

J.,

dissenting),

abrogated in part by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)).
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balance is, in part, an end in itself, to ensure that States function as
political entities in their own right." 2 6 8
Understanding federalism to be intrinsically valuable is
problematic, as it provides no deeper principles to resort to in hard cases.
It seems shallow and incomplete to say that an institutional structure is
an "end in itself,"26 or, as Michael Dorf describes it, "that state
sovereignty is one of the cold hard facts of life." 270 Read charitably, this
might be understood as a historically based social contract theory: the
states were sovereign entities before 1789, and the Constitution is
contract whereby the states willingly gave up some of their power. This
would explain the emphasis on "residual" powers being "preserve[d]"even after the ratification. 2 71' As Dorf writes, this view understands "the
parties to the contract were sovereign States and therefore honoring the
contract means protecting state sovereignty."27 2
Thought to be at the core of such residual power is the "police
power"-a power which existed pre-ratification, and is thus called
"historic.""2 7 In turn, the core of the police power has been described as
"[t]he promotion of safety of persons and property." 7 Power to protect
people and things, though, further implies the power to prohibit and
punish conduct.2 75 Therefore, criminalization is viewed as one of the
primary aspects of state sovereignty.276 Sovereignty Federalism results in
268.
269.

Bond, 564 U.S. at 221 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 181).
New York, 505 U.S. at 181.

270.

Michael C. Dorf, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Federalism, 28 RUTGERs L.J. 825,

829 (1997).
271. It also comports with other language in the earlier New York case, where the Court quoted
The Federalist No. 39: "States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.... The
residuary
and
inviolable
to
the
several
States
a
Constitution
instead
'leaves
sovereignty,' . . . reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." New York, 505 U.S. at
188 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
272. Dorf, supra note 270, at 830. Dorf sees two problems with this theory of federalism. First,
that "we have no good reason to believe that a legal document's legitimacy rests entirely, or even
principally. on adherence to some original understanding," and second, that "the terms of the social
compact were significantly altered in the wake of the Civil War." Id. at 830-31 (footnote omitted).

273. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
274. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). "The States have broad authority to enact
legislation for the public good--what we have often called a 'police power."' Bond v. United

States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).
275. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court observes that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act operates in two areas traditionally subject to legislation by the States, education
and enforcement of criminal law."); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) ("The States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The States' core police powers have always
included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their
citizens." (first citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); and then citing Whalen v.

Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977))).
276.

The real historical story is more complicated. Dubber has exhaustively chronicled the
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a narrow view of the federal government's power to criminalize, and
assumes that most crime can and should be dealt with at the state level.
For example, when the Court reached the merits in Bond, it emphasized
that a federal crime prohibiting possession of "chemical weapons" ought
not be applied to cases of local assault using chemicals because to do so
would "intrude upon the police power of the States." 2 n
V.

THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Having now looked more closely at federalism and its values, it is
important to understand more precisely what federalism argues against:
Supreme Court regulation of state criminal law. What would a
constitutional criminal law look like if it were to be created?
Remarkably, this issue is undertheorized in both case law and
commentary. In what follows, this Article discusses both the general
nature of these types of rules, as limitations on legislative power, and
three prominent instantiations: offense definition rules, conduct
protection rules, and sentencing proportionality rules.
A.

The Law of Criminal Law: Rules About Rules

When analyzing the concept of constitutional criminal law, it is
most important to understand the implication of the first word:
constitutional. This means that we are concerned with the proper scope

and content of the "law o/criminal law," not of the "criminal law" itself.
Constitutional criminal law does not contain rules regarding conduct in

society-it contains rules about these rules. In analytic jurisprudential
terms, this law would be composed of "secondary rules" 2 like H.L.A.
Hart's "rule of recognition," which, as Scott Shapiro summarizes, "sets

'

out the criteria of legal validity." 2 0 Moreover, the norms of
constitutional criminal law-these secondary rules are not directed at
28
citizens obeying the law, but instead at the officials who make it.
Importantly, the rules imposed on these officials take the form of

evolution of the meaning of "police," which in ancient times meant patriarchal household
management, and later - in America-non-justiciability. DUBBER, supra note 111, at 190-203.

277.

Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092.

278.
279.

See infra Part V.
SCOTT J. SlHAPIRO, LEGALITY 80, 86-88 (2011); see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPTOF LAW

.

81 (Paul Craig ed., 3d ed. 2012) ("[R]ules of the first type impose duties: rules of the second type
conter powers ...land] provide for . . the creation or variation of duties . .
280. SHAPIRO, supra note 279, at 85.
281. Id at 84-85.
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"disabilities"-in Hohfeldian terns 282-limaitations on power, and not
grants of power. 28 3 Hart describes this in The Concept of Law:
A constitution which effectively restricts the legislative powers of
the supreme legislature in the system does not do so by
imposing . . . duties on the legislature not to attempt to legislate in

certain ways; instead it provides that any such purported legislation
shall be void. It imposes not legal duties but legal disabilities. "Limits"
284
here implies . . . the absence of legal power.

Constitutional criminal law, then, is a body of secondary rules that
place disabilities on legislatures in the creation of criminal offenses. Put
more plainly, it limits the power of punishment.
These types of rules could take many forms, though-some perhaps
yet to be imagined. In order to ground ourselves in reality, we will look
only at the most common types of constitutional rules that the Court has
imposed or refused to impose in the area of criminal law.
B.

Offense Definition Rules

One form of constitutional rule about criminal law is a rule about
the manner in which offenses can be defined. While the word "crime"
appears multiple times in the Constitution, it has never been interpreted
by the Court.2 m' An offense definition rule would form part of such
an interpretation.
While offense definition rules remain with few exceptions-nonconstitutional in status, they are well known to nearly everyone who
thinks about criminal law. As Jeffries and Stephan write, "'[C]riminal
law doctrine' refers not to the traditional definitions of specific offenses
but rather to the conceptual structure of crime definition. This structure
has been distilled from the common law tradition by generations of
scholars and judges." 286 All this has been referred to by George Fletcher

282.

See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in

Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALt L.J. 16, 55, 58 (1913); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefroin Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 986 (1982).
283. Hohfeld, supra note 282, at 30. Thus, the Court was correct in one respect when it

concluded that "a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility" would be "limitation by fiat."
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968).
284. HART, supra note 279, at 69; SHAPIRO, supra note 279, at 89-90 (discussing legal "autolimitation").
285. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .
);I...Powell,
392 U.S. at 535-37.
286. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 4 ("[T]here is already much greater unity among diverse
systems of criminal justice than we commonly realize."); Jeffries & Stephan, supranote 31, at 1370.
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as the "grammar of the criminal law.... [T]he deep structure, both the
syntax and the semantics, of defining and punishing crime." 7
The most well-known parts of this conceptual structure are the
formal requirements of a voluntary act-actus reus-and a blameworthy
mental state-mens rea. 288 Requiring that an offense include a voluntary
act ensures that punishment will be limited to conduct, and not mere
thoughts, circumstances, conditions, or statuses. 289 Whereas the
requirement of a culpable mental state limits punishment to conduct of
which the actor is subjectively aware. 2 o This dichotomy is present at
least as far back as Blackstone, who wrote that "to make a complete
crime, cognizable by human laws, there must be both a will and an
act." 2 ' Highlighting the traditional importance of actus reus and mens
rea, Robinson writes, "The distinction between these two concepts
represents one of the most basic organizing distinctions in criminal
law today." 29 2
Also notable is the legality principle and its sub-parts. The legality
principle, put simply, is that "[p]unishment requires a crime, defined by
law." 293 its more famous, and ancient, formulation is nulla poene sine
lege. However, in order to flesh out this principle, it is usefully divided
into at least five sub-parts: legislativity, 294 prospectivity, 295 publicity, 296

287. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE.
AND INTERNATIONAL 8 (2007). Paul H. Robinson, too, calls this constellation of rules "the structure
of criminal law." See GuYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CRIMINAL
LAW 98 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2016) ("[T]he concept of a criminal offense . . has implications for
[its] form."). See gencrally THE STRUCTURE AND LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (Paul H. Robinson ed.,

2014).
288. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 31, at 1370-72, 1376-79 (discussing proportionality as an
additional fundamental constraint).
289. Statuses include the identity, characteristics, or dispositions of the offender. Id. at 1370
(noting that liability cannot be premised on "personal characteristic or status").
290. "Offense elements are of two kinds: (1) objective elements defining the required conduct.
and any required antecedent or concurrent circumstances or results; (2) subjective elements,
defining the offender's beliefs, desires, or mental states at the time of his or her conduct." BINDER,
supra note 287, at 95. Admittedly, these concepts are easy to confuse. As Fletcher observes, "The
requirement of action blurs into the requirement of voluntary action and in turn into the element of
mens rea or culpability." FLETCHER, supra note 287, at 287.
291. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *21 (1769).
292. Paul H. Robinson & Joshua Samuel Barton, Introduction to THE STRUCTURE AND LIMITS
OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 287, at xii.
293. BINDER, supra note 287, at 100.
294. Offenses must be created only by legislatures. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,
11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (holding that there are no common law federal crimes).
295. Offenses must only punish conduct committed after the crimes are promulgated. See U.S.

CONST. art. I,

§ 9, cl.

3: id.

§

10, cl. 1.

296. Offenses must be published and not secret. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228
(1957) (stating the notice requirement).
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specificity,2
and regularity (generality). 2" All these requirements are
designed to preserve individual liberty against arbitrary government
power. Thus, Fletcher calls this "negative legality," which is the shield
against "an aggressive state that will invariably seek to impose its will
on its subjects." 299 Note that the legality principle, unlike most other
offense rules, is largely protected by constitutional provisions and by
Supreme Court case law.
The conceptual structure of an offense contains much more than
mens rea, actus reus, and legality, though. Sometimes culpable choices
are made not to act, and we call these "omissions." Criminal law
generally demands that offenses punishing omissions do so only in the
presence of a duty to act.3 01 As the Model Penal Code stipulates,
"Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an
omission ... unless . . . a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise
imposed by law." 302
Moreover, many offenses take a form which is different from that
of direct perpetration; liability is extended anticipatorily to nonconsummated offenses, and participatorily to actors other than the direct
perpetrator. 303 Thus, criminal law recognizes attempt, solicitation, and
conspiracy, but also recognizes a "merger" rule that prevents doubleliability for both the anticipatory offense and a completed offense-say,
for attempt and for the completed offense.304 Moreover, while
jurisdictions diverge, some recognize a limit to attempt liability when an
attempt is impossible or abandoned.305 With respect to participatory
297. Offenses must clearly state the conduct they prohibit. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 357-58 (1983) (stating the vagueness doctrine).
298. Offenses must not target individuals or groups by name. See BINDER, supra note 287, at

100 (discussing the legality principle and defining regularity). "Regularity" is guaranteed by the bill
of attainder provisions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id § 10, cl. 1.
299. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 207.
300. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (discussing the vagueness doctrine as effectuating
notice, and non-arbitrary enforcement requirements); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10,

cl. 1.
301. BINDER, supra note 287, at 118-19.
302. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2016); see FLETCHER, supora note 28,
at 47-48 (noting that the imposition of these duties "raises serious problems" of legality given that
they are usually judicially generated).
303. See BINDER, supra note 287, at 288-328.
304. Id. at 230-33, 288-313. This is not frequently extended to conspiracy, however. Id. at 308-

09.
305. Id. at 298-303. American courts normally only exempt from liability legally impossible
attempts-when an actor mistakenly believes that his conduct is an offense. Id. at 299-301. These
can be distinguished from factually impossible attempts. See FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 176-77
("What people mean when they talk about impossible attempts is that some specific factual barrier
prevents consummation of the offense: the gun is unloaded, the pocket is empty, the powder is just
powder.").
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liability, criminal law has also recognized complicity as an offense form,
but requires that aiding and abetting happen before completion of the
principal's offense, and that the accomplice possess some minimal
mental state with respect to the principal's ultimate aims. 306

Once the offense elements are met, the concept of criminal law
continues to impose structure to the analysis in the form of defenses.
These are rules about liability that, unlike offenses, "exculpate" a
defendant."' First, sometimes the elements of an offense are satisfied
yet the defendant did not act wrongfully-defenses of this type are
called justifications.3 0 s Second, the elements of an offense may be
satisfied and the conduct wrongful, yet we have deemed that punishment
is inappropriate based on qualities of the specific defendant-these are
excuses.309 Recognition of these two defense-types is essential to
limiting punishment to cases where it serves its purposes. As Guyora
Binder writes, "[A] justification applies normative principles of
criminalization directly to the criminal's act . . . [and] [a]n excuse
applies normative principles of punishment directly to the criminal."""
Finally, and easy to overlook, is the more modem concept of
element analysis-the requirement that crimes "provid[e] a precise
statement of all separate elements of an offense definition."" We could
imagine a crime that consisted of mashed together words creating some
nebulous zone of prohibited conduct, but that would be unacceptable.
Criminal law instead demands precision and clarity by organizing itself
with elements, and delineating between subjective elements, the
culpability elements, and objective elements, such as the conduct,
circumstance, and result elements. 12 These distinctions "provide fair
notice of the scope of the prohibition, eliminate the need for judicial
construction that may expand or reduce that scope, and delineate the
scope so as to limit the arbitrary administration and application of
306.
307.
308.

BINDER, supra note 287, at 316, 320-21.
FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 93.
BINDER, supranote 287, at 336.

309.

Id. at 335-36.

-

310. Id. at 334. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Larry Alexander note that "[t]here is considerable
controversy over how best to understand justifications and excuses." LARRY ALEXANDER ET AL.,
CRIME AND CULPABILITY 89 (2009). They also summarize the generally accepted view that
"justifications are thought to focus on the wrongfulness of the act, excuses center oil the
blameworthiness of the actor." Id. For more on the difficulty in conceptualizing this distinction see
Kent Greenawalt, DistinguishingJustificationsfom Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 91

92 (1986); and Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 648-49 (1984),
reprinted in THE STRUCTURE AND LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 287, at 68-69.
311. Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analt'sis in Defining Criminal Liabilit': The
Model Penal Code and Bevond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 704 (1983).

312.

Id 706-09.
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criminal laws.""' While offense elements themselves have
constitutional status,314 element analysis does not.
All of the above rules form the conceptual structure of criminal law,
and impose a rational order for the definition and interpretation of
offenses. For our purposes, it is important to note that these rules are
almost entirely trans-substantive: they apply to all types of crimes.
However central, though, these rules are almost entirely absent from
constitutional law.3 1 6
C.

Rights-Granting(Conduct Protection) Rules

The second category of rules the Supreme Court could impose on
state criminal law is simpler to conceptualize, and is addressed more
rarely: conduct protection, or rights-granting, rules. These will be
prohibitions on prohibitions-the Court telling state legislatures what
conduct they cannot punish. 317 For the citizen, though, these rules
function as "imnunities"" in that they immunize conduct from the

reach of criminal law. The Court creates such "immunities" when it
recognizes "rights" or "liberties."
The best examples of this in criminal law are the privacy casesoften thought of as the substantive due process cases-culminating in
Lawrence v. Texas.3 9 However, cases like these are so few that they are
all well-known to students and teachers of criminal law.no While
313.

Id. 703-04 (footnotes omitted).

314. See h re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970).
315. The only exceptions that come to mind would be any justifications or excuses that have
limited factual applications. For example, the justification of self-defense applies only to offenses
involving violence against other persons. Note that I do not include various conceptions of a
criminal offense that are borrowed from non-Anglo-American systems. For example, in German
criminal law, all offenses must protect one, and only one, recognized legal interest. See FLETCHER,
supra note 28, at 105 ("Most . . norms of the criminal law are designed to protect specific legal
interests-what the Germans call Rechtsgfiter."). This type of requirement would not be transsubstantive, and would be more akin to the conduct protection rules discussed next. See infra Part

V.C.
316. As mentioned earlier, legality is a notable exception. Note too that the Supreme Court has
extensive case law on some of these issues, such as conspiracy liability and mens rea, but these
cases are limited to an interpretation of federal statutes. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 260-73 (1952) (discussing federal statute on mens rea); Kotteakos v. United States, 328

U.S. 750,
317.
318.
319.

769-77 (1946) (discussing federal conspiracy statute).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-79 (2003).
See Hohfeld, supra note 282, at 55-56; Singer, supra note 282, at 986.
539 U.S. 558; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (discussing

line of substantive due process cases in criminal law).

320. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759-61 (2010); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 564-69, 573-78; Glucksherg, 521 U.S. at 720-21; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 844, 846-53 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271-84
(1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986), overrded by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558;
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Lawrence represented a momentous development, we have not seen new
extensions of its rationale in criminal cases. There have been no new
conduct protection rules flowing from the right to privacy-at least not
in criminal cases.3 21
The other major category of rights-granting rules involves a far
more developed jurisprudence: that of the First Amendment. There are
many cases protecting speech, expressive conduct, and religious
exercise. For example, the Court has invalidated, either facially or as
applied, criminal laws that punish wearing clothing with curse words on
3 23
and ritually sacrificing animals.3 24
it,322 burning the American flag,
One cluster of cases in the First Amendment criminal context is worthy
of special mention-the so-called overbreadth cases.12 ' According to the
doctrine of overbreadth, a law can be challenged as facially
unconstitutional even when its application to the defendant who is
challenging it would be constitutional when viewed in isolation. 326 An
example of an overbroad offense is one that prohibits showing a drive-in
movie containing nudity-overbroad because "nudity" contains
innocuous images such as "a baby's buttocks."327

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54
(1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthoodof Se. Pa, 505 U.S. 833; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405

U.S. 438, 440-41, 453-55 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9, 12 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 500 (1961): Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397-401 (1923).
321. The recent case extending the fundamental right of marriage to homosexual couples,
Obergefell, was an expansion of the substantive due process jurisprudence, but was not a criminal

case. See Obergefell v. Hodges,

135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). Still, Ohergefell would

presumptively invalidate any state attempts to criminalize gay marriage, and therefore may be seen
in some sense as a conduct-protection rule. Id at 2600-05, 2607-08 ("But while Lawrence
confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without
criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there.").

322.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 22-26 (1971) (noting that the defendant was arrested

and convicted for wearing a jacket with "Fuck the Draft" written on it in a courthouse lobby).

323. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399-400, 410-20 (1989).
324. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524-28. 53132(1993).
325. Earlier overbreadth cases were not limited to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Aptheker v.
Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964) (suggesting that the statute was overbroad because it
infringed on the right to travel).

326.

Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004) ("[O]verbreadth challenges call for

relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination that the law would be
unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand."

(citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56, 55 n.22 (1999))). While overbreadth is
technically limited to First Amendment claims, Richard Fallon argues persuasively that the use of
facial challenges is not. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99
CALIF. L. REv. 915, 926-42, 941 tbl.1 (2011); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial

Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 365-71, 377-81 (1998).
327. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
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It is important to note that, unlike the offense definition rules
discussed earlier, conduct-protection rules are substance-specific-the
technical term would be cis-substantive. That is, they are limited in
application to certain categories of primary conduct. The privacy and
First Amendment cases illustrate this feature well. Perhaps because of
their specificity, the cases addressing constitutional claims of this kind
are far rarer than those addressing offense definition rules, and
consequently, federalism is employed more rarely to beat them back.
D.

ProportionalityRules

The final category of constitutional rules to discuss is that of
sentencing proportionality rules. These rules are premised on the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,32 8 which the Court
has interpreted to require "that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to offense." 3 29 Youngjae Lee distills
these rules into four categories,330 only one of which is of concern
to the present discussion: "[C]onstitutionally permitted types of
328. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This Clause of the Amendment has been incorporated against
the states, but the Excessive Fines Clause has not. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco

Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60, 266-68 (1989) (discussing the historical application of the
Excessive Fines Clause to fines "imposed by, and payable to, the government[]" and holding that
the Clause does not apply to awards of punitive damages among private parties).

329.

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 365-67 (1910). For an in depth explanation of the

reasons why proportionality is desirable, consider the following:
The fundamental legal protection that people be punished no more than they deserve is
thus a requirement that flows neither from the laws of morality nor from some general
principle that people ought to receive only what they deserve. Rather, it is one of many
conditions that attach to the govemment's exclusive control of the power to criminalize
and punish, and only by respecting such constraints can the State maintain the legitimacy
of its exclusive control.

Youngiae Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1835, 1838 (2012); see Alice
Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 266 (2005)
("[Pjroportionality is better understood as an extemal limitation on the state's power to incarcerate
or execute individuals, and this limitation applies whether the state is punishing to exact retribution,
to deter, to incapacitate, or (as is most often the case) to pursue some amalgam of ill-defined and
possibly conflicting purposes.").

330.
The first category prohibits certain types of punishments, such as buming at the stake,
crucifixion, drawing and quartering, and torture. In the second are constitutionally
permitted types of punishments that are nevertheless unconstitutional because they are
disproportionate to the crimes for which they are imposed. The third category includes
so-called "super due process for death" or "death is different" cases, which allow
sentences of death only after procedures mandated and approved over time by the
Supreme Court. Finally, in the fourth category are punishments that satisfy the
requirements of type, proportionality, and procedure, but are nevertheless
unconstitutional because of how they are administered.
Lee, supra note 140, at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
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punishments that are nevertheless unconstitutional because they are
disproportionate to the crimes for which they are imposed.""' Outside of
the unique death penalty context, this is basically an assessment of
the proportionality of periods of incarceration. For example, a
proportionality rule of this type might look like this: it is
unconstitutional to sentence an offender to life imprisonment without
parole for writing a bad check.332
Importantly, these rules only modify the amount of punishmentnot whether something can be punished in the first place. 3 In this way,
they are fundamentally different from offense definition and conductprotection rules. However, proportionality rules are similar to conductprotection rules in that they seem to be substance-specific, and apply to
single classes of conduct, and not across all crimes generally. In fleshing
out the meaning of proportionality by creating a proportionality rule, one
must necessarily delineate a specific category of conduct and compare it
to a specific category of punishment. The cases discussed earlier show
that federalism is consistently invoked to reject these rule-types,
although the cases that address proportionality claims are less prevalent
than are those addressing offense definition claims.
VI.

THE FEDERALISM RATIONALE ASSESSED

We now have a more precise understanding of the different theories
of federalism, and of the different types of constitutional rules that could
be imposed in the context of substantive criminal law. In what follows, I
assess what each variant of federalism means for each type of
constitutional rule-that is, whether the theory is a good or a bad reason
for creating rules of such a type.334
First, we will engage in a sustained examination of the versions of
federalism that the Supreme Court itself used to resist imposing limits on
substantive criminal law. 3 As our discussion of the line of cases above
should make clear, two theories are invoked consistently:
Experimentation Federalism and Morality Federalism. We will address
each type of constitutional rule-offense definition, conduct protection,
and sentencing proportionality-and assess the impact of these theories

331. Id. at 678 (footnote omitted).
332. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-89, 295-300, 303 (1983).
333. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-68 (1962). The prohibition on status crimes
announced in Robinson, while premised on the Eighth Amendment, was more accurately described
as a conduct protection rule, Id.
334. See infra Part VI.
335. See infra Part VI.A.
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for each rule-type."' The goal of this effort is to understand whether the
Court's own stated reasoning for judicial restraint in substantive criminal
law has merit. As we will see in Subpart VI.A, the strength of the
federalism rationale depends both on the variant of the argument that is
being employed, and on the target of its application-the rule type it is
used to resist.337
Next, we will address those theories of federalism that the Court
has not itself invoked in the same context. 338 These theories come from
unrelated federalism cases, and from scholars, but for whatever reason
the Court has avoided employing these arguments in constitutional
criminal cases.33" Because these theories are external to the case law, this
analysis will be less extensive. Moreover, since the features of these
theories apply uniformly to all three types of constitutional rules, the
discussion will not be broken down on that basis. As we will see, some
of these federalism theories would strongly support the Court's restraint,
whereas others are entirely inapposite. 340
A.

The Internal Critique:Assessing the Court's Reasoning

We begin with the internal assessment of the reasoning in the
Court's case law. We will address each rule type in turn, and see
whether the different variants of federalism that the Court has invoked
can justify restraint.
1. Offense Definition Rules
We turn first to offense definition rules, the rule-type most
prevalent in the line of cases discussed earlier. Ironically, although these
rules are the most common targets of the federalism argument, I suggest
that it is here that the argument is at its weakest application. 341 Being
trans-substantive, offense definition rules do little to inhibit state policy
experimentation, thus weakening the Experimentation Federalism
argument. Moreover, any moral disagreement that these rules might
provoke is very unlikely to cluster itself geographically, thus weakening
the Morality Federalism argument.

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infla Part
infra Part
infra Part
See infra Part

VIA.
VI.A.
VI.B.
VI.B.
VI.B.
VIA.I.
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a. Experimentation Federalism
Since offense definition rules are trans-substantive, they will only
minimally inhibit state experimentation, and therefore Experimentation
Federalism is an insufficient reason to reject these types of rules. That an
omission offense requires the existence of a duty does not dictate to a
state what the duty must be; that attempts must be limited by a merger
rule does not tell a state what attempts can and cannot be punished. The
list could go on. The point is this: the really important part of policy
"experimentation" takes place at the conduct-selection phase of
criminalization, and not at this secondary stage of structuring the offense
definition. State policy choices should be respected, but a constitutional
criminal law of the first kind of rules does very little to undermine them.
Take, for example, the societal problem of drug-driven violence.
There are many ways to combat and prevent this type of violence, and
different jurisdictions might experiment to find that one is more effective
than another. Use of drugs could be criminalized, thus inhibiting the
"demand" side of the drug market, and therefore reducing the
concomitant violence. However, "manufacture" of drugs could also be
criminalized, thus shutting down the "supply" of drugs and any resultant
need for violence. Is this type of experimentation inhibited by transsubstantive offense definition rules? Not really. Requiring a minimum
mental state to protect against innocent cases of possession does little to
thwart state policy; requiring that these offenses be written with clear
elements susceptible to element analysis is similarly a low hurdle.
Consider the seminal Powell case. The Texas legislature wrote the
following offense: "Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of
intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own,
shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars." 342 Presumably, the
societal problem the state attempted to address with this crime was
disorderly conduct in public caused by intoxication. However, in writing
the offense the way it did, the state arguably (1) criminalized an act that
could be non-voluntary; and (2) created a strict liability crime.43 Were
the Court to find that one of the above two features made the crime
unconstitutional, this would only minimally impact the state's ability to
address public drunken disorder. An act element could be included in the
clause "be found," and a mental element added before that. This would

342. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477
(West 1913)).
343. Also, it was arguably overbroad in that it criminalized being drunk in someone else's
house. This attack, however, would be seeking in effect a conduct-immunization rule, which we are
not addressing here.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss2/6

54

Fissell: Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law

2017]

FEDERALISMAND CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

543

have the beneficial effect of screening out many innocent offenders,
while more precisely targeting the societal harm intended to be mitigated
by the legislature.
McMillan is another example: there, the Court rejected a claim that
Pennsylvania needed to make possession of a fireann an offense element
if it wanted to punish a defendant more severely. 34 4 The choice of
making a given fact an element or a sentencing factor, while important
to the litigants in assessing the required burdens of proof, is of little
moment to the state when making policy choices about crime. Were
Pennsylvania required to list gun possession as an element, this would
add important procedural protections for the defendant, but would create
no straightjacket on legislators trying to experiment with different laws.
It would mean that they would simply have to add the element to the
statute, and prosecutors would need to prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt. The state would still be left with all the tools it could need or
want to address the problem of gun violence.
Finally, we could think back to the burden of proof cases: Leland
(insanity), Patterson (emotional distress), Martin (self-defense), and
Medina (competency). In each of these cases, a state placed the burden
of proving the various claims on the defendant, and in each case the
Court upheld these laws by adverting to Experimentation Federalism.
Imagine if the holdings were the opposite, and the prosecution had to
disprove these circumstances as if their non-occurrence were an element.
Would this hinder state policy experimentation with respect to
addressing crime? It might require increased law enforcement and
prosecutorial resources, but it would not limit the manner in which
criminal law responds to or shapes conduct. Still, for the defendant this
choice is often very consequential-the defendant, having little
resources, pitted in litigation against a sovereign entity. For a moderate
increase in individual rights, the state suffers little in terms of the range
of its abilities to address anti-social conduct.
Overall, offense definition rules present very little impediment to
the creative construction of State policies to "deal" with crime.
Experimentation Federalism is an insufficient argument to prevent
their adoption.
b. Morality Federalism
Morality Federalism is similarly a weak argument against the
creation of constitutional offense-definition rules, although less weak

344.

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85-86, 90 (1986).
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than Experimentation Federalism. It is conceivable that a local moral
viewpoint regarding offense definitions would be stifled by a Court
imposed rule, but the possibility becomes remote when considering an
external observation: moral disagreements about offense definition rules,
to the extent that they are ever controversial,3 45 are not likely to manifest
themselves in geographic concentrations. Take the example of mens rea:
We are unlikely to see the pro- and anti-strict liability camps cluster
themselves geographically. However, unless there is some meaningful
concentration of moral viewpoints within the boundaries of a legal
jurisdiction, Morality Federalism makes no sense. As Malcolm Feeley
and Edward Rubin argue, even if America is viewed as made up of
"heterogeneous and potentially fractious" communities, these "need not
be geographically distinct and frequently will not be." 346 Summarizing
the consensus view, Jessica Bulman-Pozen concludes that "most recent
federalism scholarship has rejected the notion of state identity altogether,
at least for the majority of states."34 7 Red-and-blue election night maps
are deceptive; the real divide is between cities and rural areas, and even
this divide may be exaggerated.
345. The vast majority of these rules have uncontroversial moral content, making the value of a
local morality viewpoint less important. Most people agree that no one should be punished for an
involuntary act, or for conduct that was legally justified.
346.

MALCOLM M. FEELEY

&

EDWARD RUBIN,

FEDERALISM:

POLITICAL IDENTITY

AND

TRAGIC COMPROMISE 18 (2008). This is a standard critique of federalism more generally. See
Lawrence M. Friedman, Book Reviews, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 437, 437 (2009) (reviewing FEELEY
& RUBIN, supra) ("Federalism may be necessary, and healthy, when a country is sharply divided.
and when the components are geographically concentrated and have separate political and cultural
identities.... Federalism made sense in the United States when there were slave states and free
states, and cultural and political identities ran very deep along this fault line. There were good
arguments, then, for a federal system in the first half of the nineteenth century. But not now. The
split between North Dakota and South Dakota is not the sort of division that justifies federalism.").

347. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism. 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1110 (2014)
("Although the United States is not a homogenous polity, American heterogeneity does not closely
track state borders. Today, individuals from Montana to Mississippi to Maine can eat at the same
restaurant chains, shop at the same stores, read the same publications, and listen to the same
music . . . . To the extent the states reflect cultural differences, regional rather than state
distinctiveness is likely to be what matters. And urban/rural cleavages may generate both intrastate
division and interstate unity. Moreover, many of our major metropolitan areas cross state lines.").
348. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 346, at 117 ("The familiar political map of the United States
during the last several elections -showing red, Republican states through the center of the country
and blue, Democratic states concentrated in the Northeast and West Coast-depicts a misleading
regionalization of the vote. Looking at a county-by-county map of these elections, it becomes
apparent that virtually every state displays the same political pattern; the rural areas voted
Republican, and the urban areas voted Democratic. Divisions of this sort, which depend on class or
status or living conditions, rather than on regions, indicate a political culture that is national in
character."); Matthew S. Levendusky & Jeremy C. Pope, Red States vs. Blue States: Going Beyond
the Mean. 75 PUB. OPINION Q. 227 (2011) (arguing that division between Red and Blue states is
exaggerated, and demonstrating "a great deal of commonality between red and blue states, with
much more common ground than division between the two groups").
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If this is a weakness of federalism more generally, then it is
especially true in the context of criminal offense definition rules.
Consider the example of Egelhoff Recall that in that case the Court
refused to require that Montana allow voluntary intoxication to be
considered for the purposes of detennining mens rea.349 This would be a
trans-substantive rule, and could conceivably provoke widespread moral
disagreement. Still, would such disagreement break down along
geographic lines? Would the defenders of drunken indiscretions all
happen to live together? This seems highly implausible, and the same is
generally true for other potentially controversial offense-form rules (i.e.,
strict liability, the necessity defense, the scope of self-defense, etc.).
Consider also the example of Clark, where the Court refrained from
invalidating an Arizona law that eliminated half of the M'Naghten
insanity test.350 Deciding not to exculpate conduct that is the result of an
inability to "understand what [someone] is doing" is an important policy
choice that implicates deep ethical considerations.3' One might imagine
sharp disagreement on this question. However, would any such
disagreement be reflected in geographic concentrations? Like with the
prior example, this seems improbable.
The same can also be said of the burden of proof cases just
discussed: Leland (insanity), Patterson (emotional distress), Martin
(self-defense), and Medina (competency). Allocations of proof burdens
are important to lawyers and litigants, but they do not seem to be
morally divisive, and if they are, such division would probably not show
up in geographic pockets. Again, it might be that recognition of a
defense would provoke such a phenomenon, but not the choice of where
to place the burden.
Morality Federalism does not seem completely unjustified with
respect to offense-definition rules, but the nature of the ethical issues
implicated by these rules-and the way that this disagreement will
manifest itself, if ever-significantly weakens the force of the argument.
2. Conduct Protection Rules
We now turn to the second, and rarest, category of criminal law
rule-making from the Supreme Court: substance-specific immunization
of conduct from criminalization. These are the prohibitions on what may
be punished by state legislatures, and directly specify conduct-indeed,
often classes of conduct-that is beyond the reach of the criminal law.
349.
350.
F.3d 711
351.

Montana v. Egelhoff. 518 U.S. 37, 49-56 (1996).
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742, 749-56 (2006). aff'd sub nom. Clark v. Arnold, 769
(9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 747. 749.
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Once a rule of this type is promulgated, there is no manner in which a
state can touch the behavior through the creation of an offense. In their
substance-specific character, they are the opposites of the transsubstantive offense-definition rules. As we will see, though, while the
federalism argument is much stronger when applied to these types of
rules, it is still problematic.
a. Morality Federalism
For these rules, we will consider Morality Federalism first, as here
the problem is most apparent-if local moral viewpoints are used to
justify the non-imposition of conduct protection rules, this accords
deference to states in their restriction of individual liberty, and
punishment of its exercise. This is unappealing in a modern liberal state.
Here, of course, the Morality Federalism argument is theoretically
quite strong: certain moral communities will believe that particular
conduct is worthy of crininalization, whereas others may not, and
Supreme Court protection of certain conduct trumps local moral
consensus. If it is indeed true that criminal law reflects "religious, moral,
[and] philosophical" views regarding the "nature of man,"m and if it is
expected that these views will be at least somewhat divergent across
certain jurisdictions, and geographically concentrated, then Morality
Federalism is a strong reason not to impose nationwide, substancespecific conduct protection rules. Gambling is a crime in Utah, but
casinos proliferate next door, in Las Vegas, Nevada.' 3 Whether or not
we agree that this is an important difference in the two states' views of
the "nature of man," it is still a difference. Morality Federalism asks that
this difference be respected, and in this sense it is coherent.
Still, while we should concede that Morality Federalism is
theoretically sound when applied to these types of rules, it is
nevertheless a problematic application when viewed against the
background principles of a liberal state. 354 This is because in the unique
context of the criminal law, the local morality seeking expression will
manifest itself as prohibitions backed by punishments. This can be
contrast with other areas of law, where a robust deference to local
jurisdictions' moral viewpoints might result in increased liberty352.
353.

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.15997 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.160 (1955); UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-1102

(LexisNexis 1953).

354. A full discussion of what a modern "liberal state" is would take us far afield. For such a
discussion, see STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 78-130 (1990). For our purposes, we need emphasize only one
aspect of it, the commitment to the maximization of personal autonomy.
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examples of this include the development of state laws extending civil
rights legislation to cover sexual orientation.
Or those that grant
explicit "open carry" permission to handgun owners.356 For example,
Heather Gerken has highlighted the potential for a "Progressive
Federalism" that protects individual and minority rights.
This is not true of criminal law, and that is the problem. In a
modern liberal state with a commitment to the maximization of personal
liberty, instantiations of morality in law that take the form of punitive
prohibitions are worthy of less deference than are those that manifest
themselves in other ways. As Binder writes, "[P]unishment deprives
offenders of freedoms deemed fundamental in liberal society," and
therefore "[a] state claiming to be founded on liberal principles
must .. . justify and limit its power of punishment."- 5 1 Overall, the
criminal law seems to be too harsh a tool to be used as a vehicle for
local morality.
The problematic application of the argument here is exemplified by
the now-abandoned reasoning in Bowers v. Hardwick, which was in part
propped up by Morality Federalism: "The law . . is constantly based on
notions of morality . .. [Respondent] insists that majority sentiments
about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We
do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25
States should be invalidated on this basis."3 59 This was, of course,
repudiated later in Lawrence v. Texas, when the Court explicitly adopted
Justice Stevens's analysis in his Bowers dissent: "Our prior cases
make . .. abundantly clear [that] the fact that the governmg majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... "360
The examples of Lawrence and Bowers bring out an even more
sinister potential for Morality Federalism than merely the restriction of
liberties simpliciter-the calculated oppression of minority groups by
the majority. Washington v. Glucksberg might be seen as another
355.

See, e.g., D.C. CODE

§ 2-1401.01

(1977).

356. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West 1973).
357. Heather K. Gerken, A New ProgressiveFederalism, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2012. at 37, 3846. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A Uter 's Guide
to ProgressiveFederalism, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087 (2017).
358. BINDER, supra note 287, at 57.

359.

478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

Morality Federalism also formed a basis of Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, when he wrote that
"[t]he Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain fornis of sexual
behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable,' the same interest furthered by criminal laws against
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
360. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216).
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example."' The terminally ill are a small number of people who are
physically powerless. According
politically powerless-indeed,
deference to local morality in criminalization decisions allows for
majoritarian ethical views to ride roughshod over minorities-whatever
their composition. Professor William Stuntz is blunter: "If . .. criminal
suspects are disproportionately poor and nonwhite and so will not get
lawmakers' protection, one might reasonably expect lawmakers to be
tempted to criminalize things poor and nonwhite people do."3 6
Morality Federalism makes sense when used to counteract the
imposition of nationwide conduct protection rules. Still, this is
problematic in a modern liberal state, as it accords deference to morality
that seeks to express itself as punishment of others-and often
of minorities.
b. Experimentation Federalism
This same observation also makes Experimentation Federalism
problematic when used to resist conduct protection rules, as the
experimentation that such a rule would prevent is, again,
experimentation with the punitive restriction of liberty. 6 Moreover, an
additional consideration makes the experimentation argument less
salient here: conduct protection rules are usually so broad that they
transcend experimentation concerns entirely. They do not say that a state
may not approach a societal problem a certain way-instead, they say
that a certain class of conduct is not a societal problem that needs to be
addressed through the criminal law at all.
This observation comes from an assessment of past cases. Since
1900, the criminal cases that addressed a conduct protection claim are
limited in number.364 When the Court did act to immunize conduct in
these cases, what the opinions shared was an expansive view of the
protected behavior. As Lawrence stated,

361. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
362. Stuntz, supra note 39, at 21.
363. Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 911, 928
(2001) (-[T]he application of constitutional rights to the states limits their ability to experiment with
and provide less safeguards of individual liberties."). States may also learn bad lessons when
viewing the experiments of their counterparts. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of
Experimentation. 126 YALE L.J. 636, 665 (2017) ("[A]lthough criminal justice reform has picked up
steam in recent years, for decades crime policy was driven by prior political lessons learned in a
variety of othervise different jurisdictions that a 'soft on crime' label was to be avoided at all costs,
leading to policies that almost certainly do not maximize well-being.").
364. See supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
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.

To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward . . . . The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure,
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act.
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct . . .

Conduct protection rules, then, seem outside of the parameters of
Experimentation Federalism. Recall Susan Klein's critical clarification:
Experimentation Federalism is predicated on shared goals (when
"federal and state actors share the same basic moral framework"), with
the efficiency coming from the experimentation amongst means.6 6 A
debate about whether something should be punished by the state is a
different, and deeper, question than how best to create a licensing
scheme for ice-cutters (New State Ice).

This confusion between ends and means-and the mistaken
application of Experimentation Federalism in this area is illustrated by
the case of Glucksberg, discussed earlier. The Court lauded the fact that
multiple states "are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful
examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues,"367
and Justice Souter emphasized the states' superior "factfinding" power
(including "the power to experiment").368 This kind of sanitized
language of scientific experimentation and fact-finding distracts from the
central moral issue: whether suicide, and assisting it, should be
punished. Glucksberg's fault is not so much that it invoked federalism,
but that it invoked the wrong kind-Experimentation Federalism instead
of Morality Federalism.
The same problem is also represented by Justice Black's
concurrence in Powell. There, Justice Black noted the importance of
allowing "the most-distant Islands of Hawaii [to] apply their local rules
so as to protect a drunken man on their beaches," and of allowing "the
local communities of Alaska . . . to follow their own course in deciding
what is the best way to take care of a drunken man on their frozen
soil."3 6' Again, the issue was the punishment of a potentially nonvoluntary addiction and its byproduct-not the need to scientifically
adjust for different geographies or climates. "Experimentation" masks
over the deeper issues, and seems out of place in discussions of these
conduct-protection rules.
365.
366.
367.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
Klein, supra note 219, at 1547-48.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).

368.

Id. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring).

369.

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
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Experimentation Federalism, then, will not normally be implicated
by constitutional conduct protection rules. These rules cover broad
swaths of conduct, and place them outside the bounds of criminal law
experimentation entirely.
3. Proportionality Rules
We now turn to the final type of constitutional criminal law rule:
sentencing proportionality rules. These are the rules that set limits to
how much a state can punish certain conduct."o Recall that these rules
are closer to conduct protection rules than they are to offense definition
rules, as they are substance-specific. In engaging in the proportionality
assessment between offense and punishment, it is necessary to define a
certain crime or class of crimes.
Whether or not it is true that the failure to promulgate
proportionality rules has been "driven by concerns of federalism,""' the
argument should not be invoked at all unless it makes sense. As we will
see, the federalism argument is at its strongest when applied to
proportionality rules. Still, certain features of state practice suggest that
in order for the argument to work as it is expected, there must be some
changes made in the way that states define their punishments. Moreover,
concerns about discrimination, noted above, also loom over the
sentencing enterprise, making deference risky.3 72
a. Experimentation Federalism
Experimentation Federalism works well as an argument against
nationwide proportionality rules-at least with respect to punishment
justified by deterrence or incapacitation-punishment based on
retributivism will be discussed later." There is no universally agreedupon approach to effective punishment, and therefore this lack of clarity
invites a diversity of experimental approaches so as to find the best. As
the Court said in Rummel, "Penologists themselves have been unable to
agree whether sentences should be light or heavy, discretionary or

370. Youngjae Lee argues that federalism is not the primary reason behind the Court's
reluctance to promulgate proportionality rules. See Lee, supra note 66, at 71-73 ("What is driving
the Court's jurisprudence, rather, is the Court's reluctance to take a side on debates over competing
theories of punishment."). He may be right, but the task of this Article is to assess this argument on
its own terms.
371. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 69, 80-85. 130 (2012). But see Lee, supra note 66, at71.
372. See supra Part VI.A.2.a.
373. See infro Part VI.A.3.b.
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determinate," giving the enterprise an air of "uncertainty." 3 74 Moreover,
it is legislatures-not the Court-that have the fact-finding competence
to undertake such a task. They can set up sentencing commissions, take
into account social-science data, and observe trends over time. As
Michael O'Hear writes, "Experience suggests that reasonable minds can,
and do, differ substantially about sentencing policy.""75 All this weighs
heavily against the imposition of nationwide rules.
However, it should be added that in order for Experimentation
Federalism to work as it is supposed to in theory, there must be changes
in state sentencing practice. Experimentation is premised on the rational
adjustment of policy decisions based on objective inputs-otherwise a
state is not functioning as a "laboratory." As Bierschbach and Bibas
write, "Feedback loops do little good unless sentencers offer reasoned
explanations for what they are doing and why, and others actually take
note."376 Unfortunately, this is not how most sentencing laws have come
to be. For example, Michael Tonry wrote in 2008 that while "there is
little credible evidence that changes in sanctions affect crime rates,"
377
nevertheless, three-strikes and mandatory minimum laws proliferate.
What, then, is motivating the decision-making?
Often, the answer is an emotional, fear-driven response to a
sensational crime. Jonathan Simon described this as "unifying
and Tonry described it as
framework of 'fearing crime,'"7
"paranoia."37 ' Legislatures faced with such a phenomenon react
predictably: they "act out," as David Garland called it, "abandon[ing]
reasoned, instrumental action and retreat[ing] into an expressive
mode . . concerned not so much with controlling crime as with
expressing the anger and outrage that crime provokes."" Stuntz called
these "popular symbolic stands," which legislators often know to be

374. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283 (1980).
375. Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniforinitv/Local Uniformiit: Reconsidering the Use of
Departuresto Reduce Federal-StateSentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721. 755 (2002); see
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What's Wrong With Sentencing Equality?, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1447, 1451 (2016) (critiquing simplistic demands for "equality" as "standins for more
fundamental--and more complicated- debates about who decides sentencing issues, how they do
so, and what pwposes their decisions should serve").
376. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 375, at 1491.
377. Michael Tonry, Learningfi-oin the Limitations of Deterrence Research, in 37 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 279, 279, 285 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008). Tonry did caution that
more work needed to be done in the social-scientific field, however. Id. at 301-02.
378. JONATHAN SIMON. GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 77 (2007).

379.

MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 128-33 (2011).

380.

DAVID

GARLAND, THE

CULTURE

OF

CONTROL:

CRIME

AND

SOCIAL

ORDER

IN

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 110 (2001).
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ineffective.381 Of course, fear moves the dial in only one directionincreased severity of penalties.
The proportionality cases discussed earlier are good examples of
this problem. The three-strikes law at issue in Ewing followed the
predictable formula: the California ballot initiative was propelled into
the spotlight by the murder of young Polly Klaas by a repeat-offender,
Richard Allen Davis.382 Similarly, the draconian sentence imposed in
Harmelin for drug possession was mandated by a 1978 Michigan law-a
law drafted in the midst of a national hysteria initiated by President
Nixon's 1971 declaration of a "war on drugs.""'
Irrational decision-making is one potential pitfall of giving states
free reign over sentencing decision, but one scholar has also theorized
that rational decision-making might lead to a "race to the bottom"
between the states.384 Doron Teichman has argued that "the
decentralized structure of the American criminal justice system creates a
dynamic process in which local communities have an incentive to
increasingly harshen that system's standards."" 5 Given the "goal of
encouraging crime migration," States may respond by "gradually
harshen[ing] their criminal justice system" so as to "rais[e] the price of
committing a crime within."" As the states compete to each be harsher
than their neighbors, the overall trend will be toward harshness. 8
381. Stuntz, supra note 41, at 531. "Prosecutors sometimes succumb to their own incentives or
professional tunnel vision. Judicial elections can foster a tough-on-crime approach based on a
sensationalist case. 'Community' views might be badly fractured or, worse, reflect privileged over
disadvantaged voices." Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 375, at 1491 (footnote omitted).

382.

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14-15 (2003) ("Polly Klaas' murder galvanized support

for the three strikes initiative."). "Prior to news of Polly's death, [the sponsor] had collected only
about 20,000 signatures. Within days of the reports of her murder, Three Strikes had gathered
50,000 signatures and was well on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in
California history." Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationalitv?, 87 3. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 395, 412 (1997) (footnotes omitted).

383. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994-96 (1991). For more on the Michigan
law see People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 868, 875-77 (Mich. 1992); Anne Yantus, Sentence
Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the Need for Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 645, 648-50 (2014). For an extended discussion of the "war on drugs," including its
antecedents and results see Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227 passim
(2015) ("The impact on public opinion regarding drugs was quick. In 1957, only 5.6 percent of the
U.S. population viewed crime-related problems, like drug use, as the most important problem facing
the nation. By 1971, 37.9 percent of the population viewed crime as the most important problem
facing the nation. The media similarly connected drugs and violence by claiming that marijuana and
'knives, chains, and handguns' were commonplace in American schools. Even though these laws
were adopted across the nation, they were not effective at eliminating drug use or sales; rather, they
were used primarily as a means for politicians to appear 'tough on crime."' (footnotes omitted)).

384. Teichman, supra note 263, at 1858-64.
385. Id. at 1832.
386. Id. at 1834.
387.

Id. at 1834, 1837-39 ("In other words, while some commentators have argued that we are
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Overall, then, while Experimentation Federalism is theoretically
valid when used to resist nationwide proportionality-rules, if the
argument is to work as expected there must be significant changes in the
way states determine sentences. Ad hoc emotional reactions must be
replaced by careful development informed by social science. Otherwise,
states weaken their federalism claim, and strengthen the argument that
judicial intervention is needed to prevent excess and disproportionality.
Second, the possibility of a jurisdictional "arms race" with respect to
sentencing also suggests the potential need for federal constitutional
rules policing the outer limits of acceptable practices."'
b. Morality Federalism
Local Morality-based Federalism is similarly valid, and perhaps at
its strongest application, when used to resist nationwide sentencing
proportionality rules. Moral viewpoints about the seriousness of a given
offense are directly tied to the correspondent judgment about the need to
more greatly deter, incapacitate, or mete out retribution for that offense.
Moreover, these viewpoints about crime severity are likely to be
geographically concentrated. For example, southwestern border states
may view the problem of drug trafficking to be more serious than do
citizens of states in New England or the Pacific Northwest. States that
are known to be more friendly to gun-rights may choose to punish
unauthorized possession less severely than states that are hostile to guns.
As Chief Justice Burger wrote in his dissent in Solem v. Helm,"'
"Stealing a horse in Texas may have different consequences and warrant
different punishment than stealing a horse in Rhode Island or
Washington, D.C.""' O'Hear echoes this, noting that "[s]entencing
policy involves a variety of value judgments . . . [and] survey data
indicates that views regarding sentencing policy follow 'strong and
consistent' regional patterns, with residents of New England
demonstrating the greatest tendency to be lenient and residents of central
southern states displaying the least leniency."391 "[W]hen it comes to
witnessing an arms race between law enforcement agencies and criminals, what we might actually
be witnessing is an arms race between local communities attempting to drive crime to their
neighbors." (footnote omitted)).
388. See id. at 1866-71.
389. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
390. Id. at 309 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Interestingly, he also invoked the language of policy:
"[T]he severity of punishment to be accorded different crimes was peculiarly a matter of legislative
policy." Id. at 310.
391. O'Hear, supra note 375, at 755-56 (footnote omitted). Richard Bierschbach and
Stephanos Bibas agree: "Disaggregating sentencing through such actors furthers many of the
federalism values that scholars have touted outside the sentencing context. . . . One might even
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sentencing," write Bierschbach and Bibas, "the notion of disaggregated
decision making and some degree of normative variation at the local
level is practically baked into our constitutional framework."3 92
Morality Federalism, then, is a good reason not to impose
nationwide proportionality rules. However, as with deference in the area
of conduct protection rules, deferring to local moral viewpoints about
crime severity does come with some danger. If there are problems when
states look to local morality when deciding what is a crime, then there
are similar concerns when that morality is used to decide how bad the
crime is-and how much punishment it deserves. Sentencing disparities,
like criminalization, can be used by majorities to ostracize and oppress
minorities. The federal disparity between the punishment for possession
of crack and powder cocaine is well known, and has been criticized as
reflecting racial bias."' This disparity is present in the sentencing
schemes of many states as well.394
The Supreme Court cases invoking federalism in sentencing are
good examples of this problem. Two of them, Ruinmel and Ewing, both
involved mandatory sentencing schemes imposed by recidivist
statutes.9 5 After an extensive study of these types of laws, Markus
Dubber concluded that they were "arational" in that they made no
attempt to "advance the legitimate goals of state punishment," and
instead sought only to function as "symbolic" statements. 9 6 He noted
that many of the recidivist statutes began as voter initiatives-the most
democratic wellspring of local morality-which are often discriminatory
in intent and effect: "[I]nitiatives are problematic because they place an
ostracized minority at the mercy of an electorate unfettered by whatever
limited constraints public official debate continues to place on
representatives of the state. . . . The millions of state members convicted
of crimes constitute the paradigmatic powerless minority." 3 9 7

argue that [these] arguments . . should have special purchase at sentencing. with its lack of easy
policy answers, difficult moral tradeoffs, and inextricable connection to community norms."
Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 375, at 1488-89.
392. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 375, at 1490-91.
393. Tonry, supra note 377, at 79.
394.

NICOLE D. PORTER & VALERIE WRIGHT, SENTENCING PROJECT, CRACKED JUSTICE 3

(2011), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Cracked-Justice.pdf (listing
thirteen states with crack-powder disparities).
395. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14-16 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264-65
(1980).
396. Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 689,
689, 714-24 (1995).
397. Id. at 703.
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Again, local morality can have a more sinister side that will
manifest itself in sentencing laws."' As Bierschbach and Bibas warn,
"'Community' views might ... reflect privileged over disadvantaged
voices."399 While Morality Federalism is a good reason to defer to states
in sentencing, this deference should be tempered with the same caution
noted with respect to criminalization more generally.
B.

Assessing the PotentialApplication of Theories
Unused by the Court

Having completed an assessment of the two federalism theories
invoked by the Supreme Court in constitutional criminal cases, we now
turn to a briefer discussion of other federalism values noted by the Court
in different contexts. As we will see, some of these values are probably
omitted by the Court because they are inapplicable to criminal law,
while others, though unused, would actually bolster the Court's
arguments for restraint. 4 0 0 As mentioned earlier, because these theories
are not explicitly invoked in case law, they will be treated in less depth.
1. Liberty Federalism
We begin with what the Court called the "principal benefit" of
federalism, albeit not in a constitutional criminal case; dual sovereignty
as a check on an oppressive government, for the purpose of protecting
individual liberty.40 ' "[A] healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government," wrote the Court, "will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front." 40 2 Does this justification for
federalism counsel restraint or activism when interpreting the
constitutional limits on substantive criminal law?
To ask the question is to answer it: if the ultimate aim of Liberty
Federalism is individual liberty, then limiting the power to punish
individual conduct only enhances this. As the Court wrote in New York,
dual sovereignty is not preserved "for the benefit of the States or state
governments as abstract political entities," but instead "for the protection
398. Youngjae Lee takes note of this concern, and proposes a compromise: enforce
proportionality through process rules. See Youngjae Lee, Judicial Regulation of Excessive
Punishments Through the Eighth Amendment, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 234, 236 (2006) ("Legislators
are constitutional actors with an independent duty to observe and uphold the Constitution. One way
for the Court to protect Eighth Amendment values while deferring to legislators' substantive
decisions is to examine the legislative process to determine whether proper deliberation has taken
place, given the constitutional values at stake.").

399.

Bierschbach & Bibas, supra 375, at 1491.

400.

See infra Part VI.B.

401. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
402. Id.
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of individuals."40 3 If it is the individual that we care about, and
specifically that individual's liberty, then Liberty Federalism should not
stand in the way of recognizing offense definition rules, conduct
protection rules, and proportionality rules. These rules function as
limitations directed at the government, and the limitation imposed is on
the power to punish individuals for their conduct. These limitations,
therefore, enhance the liberty of the individual at the expense of the
power of the state. Therefore, Liberty Federalism cannot serve as a valid
argument against such rules.404 This may explain why the Court never
invokes this so-called "principal benefit" of federalism in its cases
addressing constitutional criminal law.
Imagine if the Court imposed a ban on mandatory life in prison for
"three-strikes"-think Ewing-or perhaps set a minimum mental state
for criminal punishment. Such limits on state power would only enhance
personal freedom.
2. Participation Federalism
Next, we turn to another theory of federalism that the Court has at
times invoked: greater democratic participation through smaller
governing institutions. Federalism, the Court wrote, "[I]ncreases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes."405
As we said earlier, the values of Participation Federalism are really
synonymous with the values of democracy, which are in turn seen as
intrinsically worthwhile.4 06
Once this is recognized, the conflict with judicially imposed
constitutional limitations on criminal law becomes clear. While such
rules do not technically affect the power of citizens to participate
democratically-they can still vote, and the legislature still meets-they
functionally limit participation by placing certain legislative solutions
outside the realm of possibility. Citizens are empowered to participate in
democratic processes, but the result of these processes must fit within a
judicially-created parameter. We might say that participation only
"counts" if it has at least the possibility of being effective, and that
constitutional criminal rules affect this possibility.

403. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
404. Perhaps, though, it could be said that constitutional rules of this nature would upset the
"rivalry" between the two sovereigns that Madison anticipated, thus resulting in a net decrease in
liberty. It is hard to imagine how this could happen. Constitutional rules limiting substantive
criminal law will limit both sovereigns in parallel; it is not that one would be made stronger or
weaker than the other.

405. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
406. See supra Part IV.D.
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The tension between democratic participation in governance and
constitutional rules forces us to confront the foundational problem in
constitutional law: the "counteniajoritarian difficulty."40 7 As Barry
Friedman writes, "The problem is this: to the extent that democracy
entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of
government whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have
the power to overturn popular decisions?"408 To the extent that judicial
review more generally is undemocratic, then, so too are any judicially
created limits on criminal law. Since Participation Federalism is
ultimately grounded in the intrinsic value of democracy, this theory is a
valid argument against constitutional limits on criminalization.
However, if the central problem here is the countermajoritarian
difficulty, then attempted "solutions" to that larger problem are also
answers in this context. In fact, one is particularly applicable to criminal
law: representation reinforcement. Stuntz has persuasively applied the
logic of this theory to criminal defendants,40 9 and his observations are
worthy of repeating. "A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped by
the idea, made famous by Carolene Products footnote four, that
constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or
impossible to protect themselves through the political process. If ever
such a group existed," Stuntz writes, "the universe of criminal suspects

407. Barry Friedman, The Histort of the Countermajoritarian Difficultv, Part One: The Road
to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, passim (1998). "The 'countermajoritarian difficulty'
has been the central obsession of modem constitutional scholarship." Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
408. Id. at 335 (footnote omitted).
409. Stuntz, supra note 39, at 19-24. Bilionis believes that the Court's few forays into
substantive criminal law can be explained as examples of appropriate representation reinforcement,
with its general policy of restraint justified because the democratic "process" works well most of the

time. See Bilionis.supra note 47, 1272-77, 1293-94, 1318-23. If we agree with Stuntz, though, then
judicial intervention should be the norm in criminal cases. Bilionis's approval of process-protection
is correct, but too limited in application. Bilionis and Stuntz disagree on how much
constitutionalization is needed because they disagree about the extent of the democratic system's
dysfunction in criminal law. Bilionis argues that Stuntz "takes [democratic] process less seriously
than [the Court]," and criticizes theories that aspire to a more comprehensive constitutional criminal
law as "exalt[ing] the fear of process failure in extreme cases over the day-to-day need for

legislative flexibility." Id. at 1298 n.119. Note, though, that Bilionis accepts that judicial
intervention is warranted in "extreme" cases. Id One wonders whether he believes if Ewing falls
into such a category. Stuntz's response again emphasizes the perverse incentives skewing
legislative deliberation:
My response to [Bilionis's] argument is not to deny its premise. Rather, I seek to show
that legislators' political incentives are to criminalize too much--with "too much"
defined by the preferences of the very constituents whose wishes legislators are
supposed to represent. Once one understands those incentives, one may conclude that
courts are more likely than legislatures to capture social value judgments accurately.
Stuntz, supra note 42, at 527 n.96.
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is it."410 He notes that this was a key motivation behind the Warren
Court's constitutionalizing of criminal procedure, and that its reasoning
also extends to substantive criminal law:
[I]f criminal suspects are indeed an "out group" of the sort that needs
special constitutional protection, the protection should not stop with
procedure. After all, substantive criminal law defines who suspects
are. If legislatures (and prosecutors and police officers) can't be
trusted to define how suspects are to be treated because suspects are
too easily ignored by the rest of us, presumably they can't be trusted to
decide who is a suspect to begin with. If the reason for
constitutionalizing criminal procedure is that criminal suspects are
disproportionately poor and nonwhite and so will not get lawmakers'
protection, one might reasonably expect lawmakers to be tempted to
criminalize things poor and nonwhite people do. 4 11
If the strength of Participation Federalism is its foundation in
democratic values, then theories of constitutional adjudication that
ultimately aim to further these values present a potential answer to the
"countermajoritarian difficulty." One such theory-representation
reinforcement-might fruitfully be seen as justifying limits on
criminal law.
This is well illustrated by the class of those most vilified members
of our society: sex offenders. Largely because of these offenders' lack of
political power, legislatures have been free to run amok, creating
draconian registration and community notification regimes.4 12 I have
previously argued that the legislative rhetoric leading up to the passage
of these laws shows a breakdown of reasoned deliberation.4 13 Such a
group seems to call out for "representation reinforcement," and
constitutional criminal law would fill such a gap.

410.

Stuntz, supra note 39, at 20 (footnote omitted).

411.

Id. at 21; see Stuntz, supra note 1, at 818 ("How can constitutional law and politics work

together to produce a more just criminal justice system'? How can 'representation reinforcement'
become a reality rather than a slogan? . . With regard to content, John Hart Ely had it about right:

constitutional law adds the most value when it advances interests that the political process will not
advance on its own.").
412. Bret R. Hobson. Note, Banishing Acts: flow Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex
Offenders An'av from Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961. 989-90 (2006) (calling sex offenders "reviled,
politically powerless group present[ing] . . . an expedient target for politicians").
413. See Brenner M. Fissell. Abstract Risk and the Politics of the Criminal Law, 51 AM. CRiM.
L. REV. 657, 682-83 (2014) ("Legislative debate primarily focused on sensationalistic recounting of
anecdotal evidence, appealing both to sympathy for the victims . . and to a dehumanization of the
offenders." (footnote omitted) (citing Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan s Law: A Study
it Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 331, 339 (2001))).
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3. Mobility Federalism
The next theory of federalism to consider, also unused by the Court
in criminal cases, is Mobility Federalism-the view that the existence of
multiple states "makes government 'more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry."' 4 14 Does a constitutional
criminal law prevent people from "voting with their feet" with respect to
certain issues, thereby making states less reactive to citizen preferences?
Here, again, the pro-federalism camp has a very coherent argument.
Recall that Mobility Federalism depends on the states acting as many
suppliers of different products, creating a market-like environment in
which citizens can exercise choice. When the Court promulgates a
nationwide offense definition rule, conduct protection rule, or sentencing
proportionality rule, though, such a rule destroys the market for the
given governmental rule-"product." Constitutional criminal rules are
limitations on state power; they take away the state's ability to
"produce" a given legal regime. When the Court ruled that capital
punishment could only be imposed for first-degree murder,4 1 it
eliminated the availability of harsher punitive regimes and any
correspondent market for them. All this vitiates the value of
Mobility Federalism.
Again, though, perhaps there is something unique about criminal
law that may explain why the Court has not resorted to an invocation of
Mobility Federalism here-despite its analytic coherence.4 16 One
possibility is that the core premise of this theory-the free ability of
citizens to move across state lines-is a fiction that seems intolerable to
indulge in when it is used to justify geographically disparate regimes of
criminal punishment.
Mobility Federalism accepts that it is not totally true that citizens
are freely mobile, but believes that this ability to move can in general
create a beneficial market for citizens in many regulatory areas. 417 The
414. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991)), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
415. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, passim (2008), rev'd sub nom. 624 Fed. App'x 886
(5th Cir. 2015).
416. 1 have been unable to find scholarly commentary on the use of this theory in criminal law,
other than an article authored by Doron Teichman. See Teichman, supra note 263, at 1836-49,
1858-63. Teichman posits that the theory will operate in a perverse manner in this context. I find
this telling; it seems scholars and judges are embarrassed to invoke Tiebout when speaking about
criminalization and punishment. I suggest that the argument sketched above might explain this
intuition.
417. See Tiebout, supra note 261, at 419, 423. Tiebout himself accepted that his "assumption"
of "filly mobile" citizens who "will move to that community where their preference patterns ... are
best satisfied" was an "extreme model." Id (acknowledging, for example, that "[c]onsumer-voters
do not have perfect knowledge and set preferences, nor are they perfectly mobile").
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theory relies on a rough prediction that is admittedly wrong in many
cases. 4 1 As Richard Briffault wrote, "Interjurisdictional movement is
not cost-free. It is constrained by a variety of economic and social
factors that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones. First,
there are the out-of-pocket costs of relocation . . . . Second, most people
can only reside where they have access to work." 4 19
This means that when Mobility Federalism is applied to realistic
conditions, it inherently favors maximizing the "preference patterns" of
the rich.420
While in many different areas of policy we might begrudgingly
permit the use of an ideal theory that is economically discriminatory in
the real world-e.g., taxes, zoning laws, and environmental
regulations 42 1 -if there is one area where we should draw the line, it is
criminal punishment. Criminal law is unlike other forms of regulation
because "it burdens interests not implicated when other modes of social
the power to direct the
control are employed" 422 -especially
condemnation of a community on an individual-and create a resultant
stigma.423 Mobility Federalism in the real world thus contemplates the
likelihood that there will be disparities in condemnatory punishment
solely based on economic capacity to move.
One could take the example of the imposition of strict new gun
laws in New York State.424 These laws disproportionately target rural,

418. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 33-35 (1983) (noting that while the pure assumption of mobility is "unrealistic." the competitive
market may nevertheless result in "a powerful tendency toward optimal legislation").
419. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Il-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 420 (1990) (footnote omitted).
420. Tiebout, supra note 261, at 418-19, 422 (using the term "preference patterns").
421. George G. Triantis, Foreword: The Allocation of Govermnent Authoritv, 83 VA. L. REV.

1275, 1276-79, 1281-82 (1997).
422. Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 234
(2004); see Nils Jareborg, Criminalizationas Last Resort (Ultina Ratio), 2 OHIo ST. J. CRiM. L.

521, 524-27, 532-34 (2005).
423. Hart, supra note 30, at 405 ("[Criminal conduct] is conduct which, if duly shown to have
taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community."); see John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawfid" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193, 223-28 (1991)
("[T]he factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as a system of moral
education and socialization.").
424. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00 (McKinney 1965) (expanding the definition of "assault
weapon"); Thomas Kaplan, Sweeping Limits on Guns Become Law in New York, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan.
15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/nyregion/tougher-gun-law-in-new-york.html. The
New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 was passed four weeks after
the Newtown Massacre, and implemented the federally-repealed definition of an assault weapon on
the state level. Jon Campbell, A Year After SAFE Act, Is New York Safer?, USA TODAY (Jan. 12,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationi2014/01/12/new-york-safe10:22
AM),
2014,
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less wealthy citizens more likely to possess and use such guns-usually
in upstate New York. While upper-class gun owners are able to move to
more lax states to preserve their cherished lifestyle, most will
be stuck.425
4. Inherent Sovereignty Federalism
The final theory of federalism to consider is the non-instrumental or
intrinsic theory of Sovereignty Federalism-that the preservation of the
"integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States ... is, in part,
an end in itself, to ensure that States function as political entities in their
own right." 426 Michael Dorf writes that under this view, "state
sovereignty is one of the cold hard facts of life," and its positive or
negative effects are irrelevant.4 27 As we said when introducing this
concept, it is best understood as a historically situated social contract
claim, with the "police power" over criminal law recognized as a
traditional aspect of state sovereignty.428 What is the upshot of
Sovereignty Federalism for a constitutional criminal law?
Given the historical and contractual character of this theory,
Sovereignty Federalism would impose a requirement of originalism in
interpretation. 4 29 This would then foreclose almost all constitutional
limits on substantive criminal law that might spring from un-enumerated
rights. Only those limits expressly imposed by constitutional text would
be legitimate, as only in these areas would the states have validly ceded
authority from their general police power: no bills of attainders or ex
post facto crimes, no corruption of blood, etc.
It is worth noting, though, that one originalist theory would actually
support such limits. Randy E. Barnett has written that while
constitutional text should be interpreted according to its original
meaning, "where the original meaning is incomplete or vague, the text
must be 'construed,' as opposed to 'interpreted,' in a way that enhances
its legitimacy without contradicting the meaning that does exist." 430 In
engaging in such construction, he concludes, one should apply a
"[p]resumption of [1]iberty" that favors individual rights.4 3 ' Importantly,
act/4430741; see S. B. 2230 (N.Y. 2013).
425. See Jeff Winkler, Gun-Toting Carpetbaggers, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr.
https://newrepublic.com/article/ 112889/new-yorkers-moving-texas-because-gun-control.

426.
427.
428.
therefore
429.
430.

431.

12, 2013),

Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011), rev d, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
Dorf, supra note 270, at 829.
See id. at 830 ("On this view, the parties to the contract were sovereign States and
honoring the contract means protecting state sovereignty.").
Id. at 830-3 1 (connecting the historical argument with originalist method).
BARNETT, supra note 20, at 4.

Id. at 259-61.
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the "police power"-being unwritten in the Constitution-must also be
constructed with such a presumption.432
Barnett's theory provides the intellectual scaffolding upon which
Sovereignty Federalism might admit of limitations on state criminal law,
because limitations on punishment increase liberty.4 33 This theory might
hold that, say, the common law requirement of a voluntary act was a
right "retained by the people" to limit criminalization.4 34
VII.

CONCLUSION

Federalism is an argument that is invoked consistently when the
Supreme Court rationalizes its refusal to create a constitutional criminal
law. Yet this argument has remained unexamined by scholars-perhaps
because it has become so axiomatic. A closer look at federalism as
applied in this area reveals a more complicated picture than that
presented by the Court's opinions. It shows that federalism is composed
of different variants, and that the constitutional rules it is used to resist
also breaks down into three sub-categories. Once these concepts are
disambiguated, it becomes apparent that federalism is a stronger
argument against the creation of certain rules than it is against others,
and that in some applications it is very weak. This is true both of the
theories of federalism that the Court has explicitly invoked, as well as
those that it has yet failed to use. Ironically, the most common
application of the argument-against offense definition rules-seems to
be the weakest. Moreover, what the Court has called the "principal
benefit" of federalism, liberty preservation, seems to be a justification
for, and not against, constitutional limits on criminal law. What has been
treated as an unassailable justification for judicial restraint, then, turns
out to have a far more limited application.

432.

Id. at 322-34.

433. See id. at 262-65. This could be grounded in the Ninth Amendment, which preserves other
"unenumerated rights .... retained by the people" (individuals), or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. See id. at 254-55 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).

434.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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